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Abstract 
 On the 19
th
 of May, 1790, the representatives of four First Nations of Detroit and the 
British Crown signed, each in their own custom, a document ceding 5,440 square kilometers of 
Aboriginal land to the Crown that spring for £1200 Quebec Currency in goods. Understandings 
of this treaty in historical scholarship have focused entirely on the written document and a 
controversy with the Land Board for the District of Hesse. This limited analysis has neglected 
Aboriginal accounts of the Treaty, rendering a one-sided perspective that represents only part of 
the story.  This thesis is an attempt to complicate what is now known as the McKee Treaty of 
1790 by incorporating the perspectives and actions of the Aboriginal signatories. Specifically, I 
argue that our understanding of the McKee Treaty must extend beyond the confines of the 
written treaty text that was signed on the 19
th
 of May, 1790.  Although the Treaty fulfilled the 
needs of the colonial Land Board, it also served to strengthen the alliance between the Crown 
and the Aboriginal Confederacy. Finally, this thesis also demonstrates that the Treaty was a 
means for both the Crown and Aboriginal peoples to advance their interests against the shared 
threat of the United States. 
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 1 
 
Introduction 
 
We Demand an Explanation 
The Land Board for the District of Hesse was furious when they learned of the Treaty’s 
conclusion. Gathering on the twenty-first of May, the Board, at the behest of members Judge 
Powell and the merchant William Robertson, penned an official request demanding that 
Alexander McKee explain himself to them and to His Excellency Lord Dorchester, the Governor 
General of the Province of Quebec.
1
 As the deputy Indian Agent assigned to Detroit, it was 
Alexander McKee’s responsibility as the resident officer of the Indian Department of the War 
Office to negotiate with Aboriginal peoples on behalf of the Crown. This McKee had done when 
he sent word to the Land Board that “the cession from ye Indians to the Crown is now completed 
according to the limit specified” [sic].2 
Powell and Robertson had no issue with the creation of a treaty and the surrender of a 
huge tract of land to the Crown. Indeed, they were partly responsible for its creation. The Land 
Board for the District of Hesse on which they sat, along with Major Patrick Murray of the 60
th
 
Foot, Col. Alexander McKee, and Alexander Grant, Justice of the Peace and Officer of the 
Provincial Marine, were the body that had decided a land surrender was necessary.
3
 This group, 
initially formed two years before, was one of five in the western reaches of the British Province 
                                                 
1
 “Land Board, 28 May, 1790.” In Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of Ontario. Edited by 
Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906), 11-12. 
2
 “Copy of a letter received from Alexander McKee, Esquire, mentioned in above minute of the Board, 21 May, 
1790,” in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: 
L.K. Cameron, 1906), 9. 
3
 “Land Board, District of Hesse. 7th December, 1789,” in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province 
of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906), 6. The Provincial Marine was created to 
provide a naval presence on the Great Lakes to help support the Army and Government by providing transportation, 
in addition to possessing a small combat capability on the Great Lakes and Lake Champlain.  Independent of the 
Royal Navy, although it drew the majority of its officers from the Navy’s ranks, it was actually a department within 
the Army, in effect the Army’s inland Navy. 
 2 
 
of Quebec, responsible for overseeing the settlement of non-Aboriginal peoples on what had 
been Aboriginal land. The King had decreed that loyalists were to be compensated for their 
losses because of their support for the Empire, with free grants of land in British colonies— the 
extent of which depended on the individual’s status.4 This meant that land had to be found. In 
1783 there were around 30,000 Loyalists in New York City about to be evacuated by the British 
authorities who were preparing for the surrender of the city in the wake of the Treaty of Paris.
5
 
Although many of these ended up in the Province of Nova Scotia, perhaps 1,500 of these New 
York Loyalists went to the Province of Quebec. And out of these Loyalists a significant number 
decided to settle on the western frontier of the province, at the end of existing European 
settlement in the Great Lakes region.
6
 These men and women, along with individuals traveling 
north overland, represented the first major incursion of European permanent settlement in the 
region, numbering around 6,000 at the end of the war. Of these, only a few hundred at most, 
made it to Detroit.
 7
  
The problem was, the Land Board in Hesse had little to no land to give. All of the 
territory in the district that was not already occupied by settlers, with official permission or not, 
belonged to Indigenous peoples and British law required that the Crown first purchase land 
before settlement could commence. Furthermore, standing British Government policy was that 
                                                 
4
 The size of the grants depended of family size, and under further orders, military rank for those who had served in 
the military. For the extent of these grants see; “No. 21. Copy, Circular from Henry Motx to the Board.” January 19, 
1790, in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: 
L.K. Cameron, 1906), 35. 
5
 Lillian Gates. Land Policies of Upper Canada. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 18. 
6
 Gates. Land Policies of Upper Canada, 13. 
7
 Alan Taylor, The Civil War of 1812: American Citizens, British Subjects, Irish Rebels, & Indian Allies. (New 
York: Vintage Book, 2011; first published by Alfred A. Knopf, 2010), 23; this statistic appears to exclude the 
Aboriginal “Loyalists” who settled at the Bay of Quinte and on the Grand River. Maya Jasanoff. Liberty’s Exiles: 
American Loyalists in the Revolutionary World. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2011),354. 
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all Aboriginal land had to pass through the Crown before it could pass into private ownership.
8
 
This process began with a provision of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 that had been intended to 
placate Aboriginal peoples and stem the tide of American settlers moving into Aboriginal lands 
in the interior—an advance that had quickened with the defeat of the French in 1760. 
Consequently, although the Board may have been local representatives of the Crown, they still 
had to seek the authority for a surrender and the orders needed to be passed on to the Indian 
Department’s senior officer in the interior, Alexander McKee. Until such time as a treaty was 
concluded, they could do nothing to further facilitate settlement. 
After months of consultations with Governor General Lord Dorchester, in October of 
1789 the Land Board and Indian Agent Alexander McKee, received instructions from Dorchester 
to secure a land cession. In December 1789 McKee received a formal request from the Land 
Board that instructed him in the following way:  
to procure from the Indians a cession of all that tract of Land commencing at the entrance 
of the Channel Ecarté on the River St. Clare, running up the main Branch of said channel 
to the first fork on the South side ——— then a due East line to the River la Tranche, up 
the River la Tranche to its source, or until it strikes upon the Boundary of the last 
purchase from the Missasagas, bounded by the waters of the River and Lake St. Clare, 
Detroit and Lake Erie [sic].
9
 
                                                 
8
 In 1790 the area covered by the McKee Treaty, and all of what is now Southern Ontario, were part of the British 
Province of Quebec. Although Quebec under British rule had retained its seigneurial system of land tenure, attempts 
to implement this in the western portion of the province, roughly corresponding to modern Ontario, were abandoned 
almost immediately after the American Revolution, as the process of making permanent arrangements for American 
Loyalists was undertaken.  
9
 “Land Board, District of Hesse. 7th December, 1789,” in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province 
of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906), 6. The final instruction to the Board were 
received by the board on 16 October, 1789.  They can be found in, “No. 10. Copy of a letter from Lord Dorchester 
to the Board, 2nd  September, ’89. Received 16th  October, 1789,” in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the 
Province of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906), 30-31. 
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This, they felt, was the “extent of country it may be proper to treat for with [the Indigenous 
peoples], for the present, consistently with their comfort [sic]”, a consideration that Dorchester 
had ordered the Board to consider.
10
 It was in response to these instructions that McKee had set 
off to negotiate a treaty that would surrender the land to the Crown over the winter of 1789/1790.  
What Powell and Robertson found so egregious was the nature of the treaty itself. 
Although McKee felt that it had been “completed according to the limit specified,” Powell and 
Robertson felt that the inclusion of two small Native reserves along the eastern shore of the 
Detroit River were completely unacceptable.
11
 They felt that they would needlessly impair the 
development of the Detroit River and harm the British interest. Specifically, they argued that the 
more southerly of the two reserves, commonly known as “the Huron Reserve,” cut off the 
proposed site of the town that would become Amherstburg from the settled lands opposite the 
town of Detroit. Alexander McKee countered that, “I found it impracticable to obtain so 
extensive a Tract without paying some attention to the claims of the Indians [sic].”12 Powell and 
Robertson rebutted that this was nonsense, labelling the Indigenous peoples hostile, troublesome, 
and inconvenient to the good British Loyalist settlers of the region.
13
 
The other two members of the land board, however, defended Col. McKee against the 
attacks of these civilian elites. Alexander Grant, the “Senior officer Commanding his Majesty’s 
vessels on the Upper Lakes,” asserted that “all information or opinions relative to Indian affairs 
                                                 
10
 “Copy of a letter from Lord Dorchester to the Board, 2nd September, ’89. Received 16th October, 1789,” in Third 
Report of the Bureau of Archives, 30. 
11
 “Copy of a letter received from Alexander McKee, Esquire, mentioned in above minute of the Board, 21 May, 
1790,” in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: 
L.K. Cameron, 1906), 9; “Land-Board, 22 May, 1790,” in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province 
of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906), 9. 
12
 Copy of a letter from Alexander McKee, Esquire, D.A. to ye Board, 23 May, 1790, in Third Report of the Bureau 
of Archives for the Province of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906), 10. 
13
 “Land Board, 28 May, 1790”, in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of Ontario. Edited by 
Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906), 11. 
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should proceed from the Deputy [Indian] Agent.”14 Maj. Murray concurred with Grant entirely. 
The reality of life was that it was the Indigenous peoples, and not settlers, who held the balance 
of power in the Great Lakes Region. As Murray knew well, the British were too weak militarily 
to defend what remained of their North American Colonies without Indigenous allies. Indigenous 
peoples were central to the planned defense of the province and this was the Indian Agent’s job. 
Going further still, Murray was “convinced that His Excellency’s Instruction have been executed 
in the most advantageous manner for the Crown.”15 
Naturally, McKee agreed with the assessments of these two officers who had come to his 
defense.
16
 He felt that he had carried out his duties for the Crown, and had achieved a result that 
fulfilled the requirements of the Land Board, while also securing the Crown’s relationships with 
the peoples of Detroit—relationships that were essential for the defense of the weakly garrisoned 
British Province of Quebec. 
 
Forgotten Voices  
The exchange of documents between the Land Board for the District of Hess and Lord 
Dorchester about the treaty from both before and after its conclusion have formed the basis of 
much of the work that has considered the McKee Treaty to date. This is natural enough, as they 
form the bulk of the written record that relates to this treaty, which like many other Aboriginal-
newcomer treaties is poorly documented in the written record. The unfortunate side effect of this 
is that only British perspectives of the treaty have seen any significant examination to date. This 
has meant that there have been voices missing from this discussion of the treaty. For, if there 
                                                 
14
 “Land Board, 18 June, 1790,” in in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of Ontario. Edited by 
Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906), 13; “Land Board, 28 May, 1790,” in Third Report of the Bureau 
of Archives for the Province of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 1906), 12. 
15
 “Land Board, 28 May, 1790,” in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives, 12. 
16
 “Copy of a letter from Alexander McKee,” May 23, 1790, in Third Report of the Bureau of Archives, 10. 
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were at least two distinct British interests, they still only represent the perspectives of one of five 
signatory nations to this treaty. The reality is that although the voices of the members of the Land 
Board for the District of Hesse and the British Administration have dominated the subsequent 
discussion of this treaty, they did not dominate the negotiations themselves. The Crown 
appointed Alexander McKee to negotiate on its behalf, but facing him, there were thirty-five 
chiefs from the Potawatomi, Wyandot, Ojibwe, and Odawa nations of Detroit that signed the 
Treaty at the conclusion of the negotiations.
17
  
A long ignored silent majority, the Aboriginal signatories of this treaty have often been 
placed in passive roles by scholars who have failed to consider their side of the story. The simple 
fact that they were parties to the treaty, and the most numerous at the conclusion of the treaty 
makes their perspectives and understandings worthy of examination in and of itself. Yet, the 
incorporation of the understandings of Aboriginal peoples is even more crucial given the 
political realities of the spring of 1790. Given the eventual non-Aboriginal victory in the struggle 
for the Great Lakes, it is easy to misunderstand the complex cultural and political interactions 
that produced the McKee Treaty. In the spring of 1790 however, the so called Sixty Years War 
for the Great Lakes was far from over.
18
 This struggle would only turn decidedly in favour of the 
United States four years later at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in August, 1794.  
In the spring of 1790 the British and the Aboriginal peoples of the Confederacy were still 
partners in a relatively equal relationship based on mutual necessity. At this time the Aboriginal 
                                                 
17
 There were thirty-five Indigenous signatories of this treaty, whose doodem images appear on the document signed 
on 19 May, 1790. The Ojibwe chief Nangie’s name is excluded from transcripts of this treaty made from a copy that 
was included in the Records of the Land Board for the District of Hesse on 22 June, 1790 by the board’s secretary 
Lt. T Smith. This error is present in the most frequently used transcript of the treaty, that included in Indian Treaties 
and Surrenders, Vol. 1 printed for the Government of Canada. 
18
 The Sixty Years War for the Great Lakes refers to the period from 1754 to 1814 of nearly constant warfare 
between various Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal peoples for control of the Great Lakes region. David Curtis Skaggs 
& Larry L. Nelson, Eds. The Sixty Years’ War for the Great Lakes, 1754-1814. (East Lansing, MI: Michigan State 
University Press, 2001).  
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peoples of the Western Confederacy, including those at Detroit remained a military force to be 
reckoned with, posing a significant threat to anyone attempting to encroach on their lands. They 
clearly demonstrated this through the 1780s and the early 1790s as they continued to actively 
fight the United States and encroaching American settler in the interior, in what has historically 
been referred to as the Northwest Indian War, or Little Turtle’s War. In 1790 and then again the 
following year, the combined forces of the peoples of the Western Confederacy defeated two 
successive American armies sent against them, inflicting two of the greatest defeats the United 
States Army has ever suffered. The second, the Battle of the Wabash remains the largest battle 
ever won by the Aboriginal peoples of North America, and was “proportionally the biggest 
military disaster the United States ever suffered”.19 The result was that, throughout this period, 
the United States was unable to enforce their will throughout most of the territory they claimed 
in the pays d’en haut as a result of their successful revolt against the British Crown, which 
remained instead in Aboriginal hands. 
The military strength of the Western Confederacy and its constituent peoples in this 
period was none the less reliant upon the British, who supplied various trade goods, and in 
particular firearms and ammunition necessary to continue the fight.
20
 This was offset in turn by 
the military reality of the post-Revolutionary War period in British North America. The 
downsizing of British forces at the conclusion of the conflict meant that the Crown lacked the 
troops necessary to defend its remaining North American colonies from the threat posed by the 
newly formed United States. Instead, they relied on the military strength of their Aboriginal 
allies for the defense of the remaining colonies. The result a state of mutual dependence in which 
                                                 
19
 Colin G. Calloway. The Victory With No Name: The Native American Defeat of the First American Army. 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), 5. 
20
 In addition to the Fur Trade, the British also provided arms, ammunition, and provisions to allied peoples in the 
Great Lakes as presents; Larry Nelson. A Man of Distinction among Them: Alexander McKee and the Ohio Country 
Frontier, 1754-1799. (Kent, OH: The Kent State University Press, 1999), 157. 
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neither side could survive as they were without the other. With neither side possessing the power 
to subsist without the other, they relied instead on mutual cooperation. It was in this context that 
these parties concluded the agreement that has since become known as the McKee Treaty of 
1790. 
There have been a number of theoretical frameworks that have been proposed by scholars 
to explain the nature of Aboriginal-European interactions in this period. Perhaps the most 
influential of these has been the concept of the “middle ground” developed by Richard White, 
and first introduced twenty-six years ago in his seminal work on the Great Lakes region.
21
 A 
metaphor for a process of cultural mediation between cultures, as well as more specifically the 
pays d’en haut, he describes which is a product of its place and time, the concept of the middle 
ground emphasises the creation of a new order. Because no individual party had the power to 
control their neighbours in the Great Lakes, each party was forced to accommodate the other 
parties, and in the process they together forged new meanings and understandings which were 
often based on “creative misunderstandings” between the parties.22 Thus what emerged was a 
new world that was neither truly Aboriginal nor truly Western, but a hybrid world containing 
both western and Aboriginal features.  
The realities at Detroit in the spring of 1790 were rather different from the features of the 
middle ground as described by White. Despite the long period of contact in the Great Lakes 
region, the peoples at Detroit remained independent and in a world in which Aboriginal peoples 
remained firmly in control. In the spring of 1790 the Aboriginal peoples of Detroit were not 
reliant on an imported non-Aboriginal imperial political “glue” to hold their communities and 
                                                 
21
 For the clearest, and most concise overview of the concept of a “middle ground” see pages XII-XIII of the preface 
to the twentieth anniversary edition of this book; Richard White. The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and 
Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011. First published 
1991), XII-XIII. 
22
 Ibid. 
 9 
 
alliances together.
23
 Indeed, in the years between the American Revolution and the signing of the 
McKee Treaty, the Aboriginal peoples of the Western Confederacy had bound together in a 
strong Aboriginal entity that actively resisted direct non-Aboriginal intervention in its affairs.
24
 
This is in turn reflective of what Kathleen DuVal has described as the “native ground”, in which 
Aboriginal peoples maintained their independence from European newcomers, while 
incorporating them into their distinctly Aboriginal world.
25
 The concept of a “native ground” 
does not imply a timeless Aboriginal world, but rather one in which change was directed by 
Aboriginal peoples themselves and not by external coercive forces.
26
 Neither of these completely 
fits the messy situation around Detroit in 1790, which was effectively divided into two worlds, 
one Aboriginal and one European, rather than one mediated whole. The region as a whole 
however, continued to remain a predominantly Aboriginal space, defined on Aboriginal terms. 
 
Land Acquisition in The Detroit Borderlands 
There had been a permanent non-Indigenous presence at Detroit for almost one hundred 
years at the time of the McKee Treaty. Initially a French Fur Trade depot, after the British 
Conquest of Quebec in 1760, British settlers joined the French. The English speaking population 
in the Detroit area increased significantly during the American Revolution with both an increase 
in troops and the arrival of numerous Loyalists. Much of this population however, technically 
resided beyond the boundaries of the District of Hesse. The district, one of four, included all land 
in British North America west of Long Point, with no defined northern limit. However, although 
                                                 
23
 Ibid. 14. 
24
 For further discussion of attempts to distance the Confederacy from non-Aboriginal influences in 1789 and 1790 
see Chapter 2. 
25
 Kathleen DuVal. The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent. Early American 
Studies. Edited by Daniel K, Richter and Kathleen M. Brown. (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 
2006),  5, 10. 
26
 Ibid. 9.  
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Detroit was the de facto district center of Hesse, officially it was also outside the district as it had 
technically been surrendered to the United States in the Treaty of Paris. The official borders of 
the District of Hesse reflected this fiction, and the district was bordered to the South and west by 
the Great Lakes system, which had been established as the border between British North 
America and the nascent United States. The official plan however, was to construct a new district 
town on the eastern bank, and settle the Loyalists on legal plots of land in British North 
America.
27
 
Although the District of Hesse had the lowest non-Indigenous population to contend with 
of all of the districts at that time, there were still several hundred Loyalists who had, for the most 
part, been illegally occupying land on both sides of the Detroit River since the American 
Revolution.
28
 A few ad hoc arrangements had been made since the beginning of the American 
Revolution to provide land to a few, but these were an exception rather than the rule. Although 
some simply squatted on Indigenous land, many of those settling on the eastern bank illegally 
acquired land on which to settle from the Indigenous peoples with their consent. Some 
negotiated illegal private purchases of Indigenous land, others received personal gifts of land 
from the area’s Indigenous inhabitants.29 Both of these approaches to acquiring a place to live 
were illegal, although this went unenforced.  
                                                 
27
 Lord Dorchester’s suggestion to the board was that the town should be located on the shore “opposite to the Island 
of Bois Blanc, a suggestion that was ultimately heeded as the location for what is now the city of Amherstburg; 
“Copy of a letter from Lord Dorchester to the Board, 2nd September, ’89. Received 16th October, 1789,” in Third 
Report of the Bureau of Archives for the Province of Ontario. Edited by Alexander Fraser (Toronto: L.K. Cameron, 
1906), 30. 
28
 Although their occupation was technically illegally occupying the land, some of these loyalists had been settled on 
plots by Governor Hamilton to raise the level of food production at Detroit during the war.  Lillian Gates. Land 
Policies of Upper Canada. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1968), 14. 
29
 Most of these gifts or purchases from the local nations were along the shore of the Detroit River, about half of 
which was settled, or in the process of being settled by 1790. There were however, a few examples of purchases 
occurring farther inland. The most extensive, and well document example of a purchase in the interior is that of 
Sally Ainse. For an overview of the early history of settlement in this area see, “Peace, Order, and Good 
Government: The Organization of a Landscape,” Chapter 2 in John Clarke. Land, Power, and Economics on the 
Frontier of Upper Canada. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001), 35-93; For discussion 
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The illegality of occupation stemmed from the fact that the British Crown had recognized 
Aboriginal peoples ownership of land in the pay’s d’en haut with the Royal Proclamation of 
1763. The proclamation had been intended to placate Aboriginal peoples and stem the tide of 
American settlers moving into Aboriginal lands in the interior—an advance that had quickened 
with the defeat of the French in 1760—in an attempt to avoid armed conflict in the interior. To 
achieve this, the Royal Proclamation declared that all land in the interior beyond the Appalachian 
Divide was reserved for the exclusive use of Indigenous peoples. To further protect these lands it 
stated that: 
no private Person do presume to make any Purchase from the said Indians of any Lands 
reserved to the said Indians, within those Parts of Our Colonies where We have thought 
proper to allow Settlement; but that if, at any Time, any of the said Indians should be 
inclined to dispose of the said Lands, that same shall be purchased only for Us, in Our 
Name, at some publick Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians to be held for that 
Purpose by the Governor or Commander in Chief of Our Colonies respectively, within 
which they shall lie: and in case they shall lie within the Limits of any Proprietary 
Government, they shall be purchased only for the Use and in the Name of such 
Proprietaries, conformable to such Directions and Instructions as We or they shall think 
proper to give for that Purpose.
30
 
This meant that although the British Crown claimed the land to the north of the Great Lakes, the 
law required that the Crown first purchase any land that was to be made available to settlers 
                                                                                                                                                             
of Ainse see; Alan Taylor. The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American 
Revolution. (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 396-407. 
30
 The Royal Proclamation of 1763, “1763, October 7. [Establishing New Governments in America.]”, in British 
Royal Proclamations Relating to America, Clarence S. Brigham, ed., Vol. 12, Transactions and Collections of the 
American Antiquarian Society (Worcester, Massachusetts: American Antiquarian Society, 1911), 217. 
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before it could pass to them and settlement commence.
31
 This also meant that although the Land 
Board may have served as the local representatives of a government claiming authority over the 
territory in matters related to land, they did not have the authority to dispose of it as they wished, 
even under British law as it was still Aboriginal land.  
Despite this, there was no pressing hurry to conclude a land surrender treaty in the 
District of Hesse. Although the town of Detroit and other British outposts had been surrendered 
to the United States in the Treaty of Paris, the Americans found the Aboriginal peoples 
unsympathetic to their claims that it was now their land. Rejecting the premise that they had been 
subjects of the King of Great Britain, they refused to recognize the legitimacy of the transfer of 
these claims to their lands. Further, this was the same territory that the United States had not 
been able to take possession of in fourteen years of continuous frontier warfare. Although non-
Indigenous people, both loyalists and others, continued to arrive after the end of the Revolution, 
their growth in the first decade was not dramatic.
32
 Thus, without any pressing needs, this area 
would see no major treaties for seven years after the American Revolution, leaving it as the last 
unceded part of the British shoreline from the Detroit River to the St. Lawrence as recognized in 
the Treaty of Paris. 
When the need to acquire land at Detroit to fulfill British plans became apparent to 
colonial officials after the formation of the Land Board, it had to be undertaken in a manner 
identified by the British as legal. The written McKee treaty document is a product of this. In 
form and function the written treaty is an English Common Law land sale agreement, similar to a 
                                                 
31
 In 1790 the area covered by the McKee Treaty, and all of what is now Southern Ontario, were part of the British 
Province of Quebec. Although Quebec under British rule had retained its seigneurial system of land tenure, attempts 
to implement this in the western portion of the province, roughly corresponding to modern Ontario, were abandoned 
almost immediately after the American Revolution, as the process of making permanent arrangements for American 
Loyalists was undertaken.  
32
 John Clarke. Land, Power, and Economics on the Frontier of Upper Canada. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2001),. 
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type that would have been used to conduct a transfer of land in England. It is specifically a 
bargain and sale with feoffment agreement.
33
 Overall there are few concessions to the particular 
use of this document to differentiate it from any other such agreement. The treaty document 
opens in standard British legal form with ‘the Premises’ in which the names of the parties are 
given, in this case “the principle Village and War Chiefs of the Ottawa, Chippawa, Pottowatomy, 
and Huron Indians Nations of Detroit [sic] and the King.”34 Apart from the names of those listed 
as parties to the agreement in ‘the Premises’, the rest of the document is straightforward and 
British in form. These are followed, in the standard fashion by the details of payment, notable 
only because the “Twelve Hundred Pounds Currency of the Province of Quebec” was to be paid 
in “valuable Wares and Merchandise” rather than cash.35 There follows a list of all of the land 
rights, as understood by the British, to the land being sold which the Aboriginal peoples agreed 
to transfer with the land, “excepting the Reserve aforesaid.” These rights were to be transferred 
to the King, and his heirs and successors for their proper use, by the chiefs, their nations and 
their “Heirs, Executors and administrators.”36  This section is followed by the signatures of the 
                                                 
33
 For information on the rather obscure bargain and sale with feoffment agreement, see; Julian Cornwall. Reading 
Old Title Deeds. (Birmingham: Federation of Family History Societies, 1993), 8. Further discussion of the bargain 
and sale with feoffment form with illustrative examples can be found on the University of Nottingham’s manuscripts 
and special collections website. “Feoffment”, University of Nottingham, 
https://www.nottingham.ac.uk/manuscriptsandspecialcollections/researchguidance/deedsindepth/freehold/feoffment.
aspx 
34
 “No. 2.” In Indian Treaties and Land Surrenders, 1-2. 
35
 Ibid. 2. Note, although many documents, including the treaty itself refer to “Quebec currency”, McKee’s entry in 
the post journal for Detroit discussing the distribution of goods to the peoples of Detroit on the 20
th
 of May states 
that “The Indians being again assembled, they received the Compensation to the Amount of Twelve hundred pounds 
Halifax Currency” (emphasis added). From 29 March, 1777 the two were worth the same, and thus are directly 
interchangeable in this discussion. Due to a shortage of coinage in the North American colonies, Quebec currency 
and Halifax currency were pegged at 5 local shillings to the Spanish dollar. The official value of the Spanish dollar 
is Sterling on the other hand was 4 shillings 6 pence. Fernand Ouellet. Economic and Social History of Quebec, 
1760-1850: Structures and Conjonctures. Translated by Robert Mandrou & Allan Greer. The Carleton Library No. 
120. (Toronto: Gage Publishing Limited in association with the Institute of Canadian Studies, Carleton University, 
1980; French Edition originally published 1966), 60, 62. 
36
 “No. 2.” In Indian Treaties and Land Surrenders, 2. 
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Europeans in attendance and the doodem
37
 images of the Aboriginal peoples who were party to 
the treaty. 
 This was a standard legal instrument used in British Common Law to facilitate to transfer 
property from one party to another and effectively serves as a witnessed record of the transfer of 
the property from the first party to the second. In this particular case, it was from the “the 
principle Village and War Chiefs of the Ottawa, Chippawa, Pottowatomy, and Huron Indians 
Nations of Detroit” to the Crown.38 As this was the standard means used by the British to transfer 
ownership of property between parties, the McKee treaty needed to follow this format for it to be 
to be considered a legally binding treaty in the eyes of the Crown. Legally, the effects of the 
agreement were simple. The Crown was purchasing ownership of the land and usage rights to the 
land specified, totalling approximately 5,440 square kilometers, from the “Chiefs of the Ottawa, 
Chippawa, Pottowatomy and Huron Indians Nations of Detroit [sic]” for 1,200 pounds Quebec 
Currency in assorted goods.
39
 In light of the purposes of the Land Board for the District of Hesse 
to the Crown, a body whose explicit purpose was to facilitate the non-Aboriginal re-settlement of 
the district in accordance with the law, the treaty includes the provision that the Aboriginal 
signatories of the treaty were specifically “allowing houses to be built upon the Premises [sic]” 
                                                 
37
 Doodems are a type of Indigenous signature taking the form of images representing individuals. For more 
information see: Heidi Bohaker. “Reading Anishinaabe Identities: Meaning and Metaphor in Nindoodem 
Pictographs,” in Ethnohistory 57, 1(2010). 11-33. Doi: 10.1215/00141801-2009-051. 
38
 “No. 2.” In Indian Treaties and Land Surrenders, 2. 
39
 Dean Jacobs. “Indian Land Surrenders,” in The Western District: Papers from the Western District Conference. 
K.G. Pryke & L.L. Kulisek, eds. Occasional Papers, no.2. (Windsor: Essex County Historical Society; printed by 
Commercial Printing Co., 1983), 64; The land purchased in the treaty is described as: “a certain Tract of land 
beginning at the mouth of Catfish Creek, commonly called Rivière au Chaudière on the North Side of Lake Erie 
being the Western extremity of a Tract purchased by his said Majesty from the Messesagey [sic] Indians in the year 
One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighty Four and from thence running Westward along the border of Lake Erie 
and up the Streight [sic] to the mouth of a river known by the name of Channail Ecarté and up the main branch of 
the said Channail Ecurté to the first fork on the south side, then a due east line until it intersects the Rivière à la 
Tranche, and up the said Rivière à la Tranche to the North West corner of the said cession granted to His Majesty in 
the year One Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighty Four, then following the Western boundary of said tract being a 
due South, direction until it strikes the mouth of said Catfish Creek or otherwise Rivière au Chaudière being the first 
offset.” “No. 2,” in Indian Treaties and Land Surrenders, Vol.2, 2; A list of the goods paid to the four nations from 
Detroit can be found at the end of the transcript of the McKee Treaty reproduced in Appendix A. 
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by the King’s subjects.40 The written treaty document includes no other clauses, leaving the 
transfer of land the sole recognized element of the treaty— according to the text.  
 
North American Treaties 
But what does “treaty” mean? Taking the common European definition, a treaty is the 
agreement that is reached between the parties, the definitive record of which is a written 
document that has been validated with distinguishing marks by the parties affirming that it 
represents an accurate record of what was agreed to. In this instance, the definitive record of the 
treaty is thus the parchment that was signed on 19 May, 1790. However, a now well-established 
body of scholarship suggests that this is a culturally relative category, rather than a universal 
fact.
41
  
 Indigenous peoples conceptions of treaties, and the ways in which they were concluded 
were markedly different from those of Europeans. Given that each of the four Indigenous nations 
that signed the McKee treaty had predominantly oral cultures, their methods of recording treaties 
were not based on pen and parchment. Instead, treaties were entrusted to memory by members of 
the people who were party to them, although they were often accompanied with exchanges of 
wampum, the meaning of which would be read to recount the treaty by the keeper who had been 
entrusted with it.
42
 Practices like the exchange of wampum, which European observers called the 
“usual ceremonies” had to be tolerated when dealing with Aboriginal peoples and were 
                                                 
40
 “No. 2,” in Indian Treaties and Land Surrenders, 1-2. Although there were thousands of Aboriginal Loyalists who 
were resettled by the Crown in Upper Canada on land acquired for that purpose, these settlements were further to the 
East at the Bay of Quinte and the Grand River. This process took place outside of the Land Board system, which 
was established by Lord Dorchester specifically for the purpose of settling non-Aboriginal peoples on Crown owned 
land. Gates. Land Policies of Upper Canada. 19. 
41
 See for example, Treaty 7 Elder’s Council et al. The True Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7, and John Long. 
Treaty No. 9: Making the Agreement to Share the Land in Far Northern Ontario in 1905. 
42
 Colin Calloway. Pen & Ink Witchcraft: Treaties and Treaty Making in American Indian History. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013), 30-31. 
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significant because they were the means of integrating agreements into Indigenous cultural 
frameworks.
43
 Scholarship on the McKee Treaty has almost entirely overlooked the multi-
layered understandings of the agreements surrounding the Treaty, favouring British perspectives 
rather than North American Indigenous ones.   
 
Historiography of the McKee Treaty 
 What little has been written about the McKee Treaty in the years since, has been 
reflective of the subsequent course of events, that saw the division of the Great Lakes into two 
nation states, and Aboriginal peoples all but erased from their former homes. This literature has 
largely ignored the military and political realities of the spring of 1790. Instead, it has largely 
focused on the treaty as an implementation of late-eighteenth century British imperial policy. 
Based on a study of the terms of the written document signed on the 19
th
 of May, and 
notwithstanding some debate over a few finer points, the McKee Treaty of 1790 has consistently 
been explained as a product of the “Indian clauses” of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 
referenced above. Because of the requirement that all land needed to pass through the Crown’s 
hands before it could pass to a private party, the treaty has been presented as a necessary legal 
procedure that needed to be undertaken to allow the development of non-Indigenous settlement. 
Consequently it has been framed as a manifestation of British Imperial policy. In this, the McKee 
Treaty is little different from many other land cession treaties that were signed in the late 
eighteenth century in what is now Southern Ontario.
44
 This has generally been taken as a 
sufficient explanation for the Treaty. 
                                                 
43
 Robert Williams. Linking Arms Together: American Indian Treaty Visions of Lay and Peace, 1600-1800.  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 81-82. 
44
 An overview of these treaties, frequently referred to as the early Upper Canadian Treaties, can be found in chapter 
3 of Jim Miller’s Compact, Contract, Covenant: Aboriginal Treaty-Making in Canada. 
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Since the late 1970s interest among historians in Indigenous-Newcomer treaties has 
increased dramatically. Over the past three and a half decades, the study of Indigenous-
Newcomer treaties has emerged as a distinct branch of historical scholarship. Although 
technically the study of formal political relations, interest in Indigenous-newcomer treaties can 
be directly traced to the activism of the 1960s and 1970s that was responsible for the birth of the 
“new history” in the discipline of history as a whole. With many treaties continuing to form the 
legal basis of relationships between First Nations and Canada and the United States, the 
emergence of scholarly interest in Imperialism, and Aboriginal activism focused on increasing 
awareness of their continued existence as distinct from mainstream society, generated 
considerable interest in these still binding relics of colonialism. The recognition of the continued 
legal force of the Royal Proclamation of 1763 recognizing Aboriginal title to all land, unless 
ceded by treaty, in the Supreme Court’s judgement in the Calder Case in 1973, and the 
establishment of the Land Claims process to deal with outstanding treaty issues in Canada which 
began in earnest in the mid-1970s, brought treaties and Aboriginal peoples to the forefront of 
political debate in Canada. In the process it definitively established the contemporary relevance 
of treaty scholarship.
45
 Interest in Aboriginal land rights has seen the emergence of scholarly 
interest in the process of treaty-making in Canada, and in British, later Canadian, treaty-making 
policy. 
Although this increase in interest has not prompted a study of the McKee Treaty itself, it 
has prompted scholars to address it to a degree. Prior to this, the McKee Treaty had only been of 
interest to those working on local histories. The pre-eminent example of this being Ernest 
                                                 
45
 Since that time, treaty issues have been increasingly commonly heard before the courts, in attempts to resolve 
outstanding issues, including many related to treaties between Aboriginal Peoples and the Government. This 
contemporary interest and relevance of the examination of treaties has led to increased interest. Reflected in the 
writing and publication of Arthur J. Ray’s book Telling It To The Judge: Taking Native History to Court.  
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Lajeunesse’s historical overview of the Detroit Region for the Champlain Society.46 Interest in 
Aboriginal land rights has seen the emergence of scholarly interest in the process of treaty-
making in Canada, and in British, later Canadian, treaty-making policy. Among these, is the 
work of three historians who have written on land acquisition in either part of all of what is now 
Southern Ontario, that touch on the McKee Treaty.
47
  
Although studies of treaty-making policy have tended to continue to focus on the 
implementation of the provisions of the Royal Proclamation, the nature of their interest has 
resulted in a change in the way that scholars approach Indigenous histories. Older local histories 
tended to herald the benevolence of the civilized British, towards the frequently unnamed 
‘Indians,’ before continuing a narrative of the construction of civilization. Policy studies have 
placed Indigenous peoples in a more prominent position. However, that has not meant that they 
have been recast as historical actors. Heavily influenced by consciousness of the colonizing 
nature of treaties including the McKee Treaty, which disrupted and displaced Aboriginal 
peoples, Dean Jacobs’ account of the progressive acquisition of Aboriginal title to land in what 
would later become the Western District of Upper Canada, presents a condemnatory overview of 
the five treaties that ceded this district.
48
 An overview of the progressing treaty-making used by 
the Crown to acquire Aboriginal land to facilitate the legal settlement, under the British Crown’s 
                                                 
46
 Ernest Lajeunesse, ed. The Windsor Border Region: Canada’s Southernmost Frontier, A Collection of 
Documents. Ontario Series IV.  (Toronto: The Champlain Society, for the Government of Ontario, 1960), cix. 
47
 These are, John Clarke. Land, Power, and Economics on the Frontier of Upper Canada. (Montreal & Kingston: 
McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2001). Jean-Rierre Morin. “Concepts of Extinguishment in the Upper Canada 
Land Surrender Treaties, 1764-1862,” chapter 2 in, Aboriginal Policy Research: A History of Treaties and Policies, 
Vol VII. (Toronto: Thompson Educational Publishing, 2010), Robert Surtees. “Land Cessions, 1763-1830,” in 
Aboriginal Ontario: Historical Perspectives on the First Nations, Ontario Historical Studies Series, edited by 
Edward Rogers & Donald Smith. (Toronto: Dundurn Press Limited, 1994), 108.. 
48
 The Western District was the most westerly portion of Southern Ontario, corresponding with the counties of 
Essex, Kent, and Suffolk. In existence as an administrative unit from 1792-1853 (Suffolk county was removed from 
the district in 1798), it was formerly the District of Hesse (1788-1792) which was the administrative unit when the 
McKee Treaty was signed.  
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recognition of Aboriginal rights, Jacobs challenges the notion of a respectable legal process, 
noting apparent problems with the process, which victimized First Nations peoples.
49
  
Scholarship on treaty policy has continued to emerge over the last three decades. The 
most recent work to address the McKee Treaty is Jean-Pierre Morin’s examination of the concept 
of extinguishment in Upper Canadian land surrender treaties. Examining both the text of the 
written treaty document and other land board records to examine this treaty, he looks at what 
they have to say that both Indigenous peoples and McKee thought about the extinguishment of 
rights. Far from being abuses of power victimizing its Indigenous signatories, Morin argues that; 
“[t]he treaty negotiated by Alexander McKee in 1790 follows, nearly to the letter, the rues and 
protocols established by the Royal Proclamation and subsequent Indian policies relating to the 
acquisition of Aboriginal lands.”50 Although he focuses on one western concept and its’ 
manifestation in this treaty, Morin’s analysis does at least consider some contemporary evidence 
about Indigenous peoples perspectives on this treaty. 
To date, the most extensive analysis of Indigenous peoples’ understandings of the McKee 
treaty is found on a few pages in Robert Surtees’ 1983 dissertation, subsequently distilled into a 
page in a chapter on land cessions in Upper Canada. In just over four lines he suggests that: 
Most likely the chiefs accepted the sale because they resided for the most part on the 
West bank of the Detroit River and beyond, and thus felt little need to retain the ceded 
eastern region. Secondly, as they faced the possibility of an American invasion of their 
territory, they probably wanted to strengthen their friendship with the British.
51
 
                                                 
49
 Jacobs. “Indian Land Surrenders,” in The Western District. For his discussion of this in the context of the McKee 
Treaty specifically see page 65. 
50
 Morin. “Concepts of Extinguishment in the Upper Canada Land Surrender Treaties,” in Aboriginal Policy 
Research: A History of Treaties and Policies, 31. 
51
 Surtees. “Land Cessions, 1763-1830,” in Aboriginal Ontario. 108. 
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This represents the only work that has considered that Indigenous peoples were rational actors, 
rather than passive recipients. Surtees research represents the full extent of scholarship on the 
McKee Treaty that has devoted some consideration to Indigenous peoples. 
In the last fifteen years or so, what scholars have shown increasing interest in is 
Alexander McKee and his role in the negotiation of this treaty as an individual rather than simply 
an imperial agent. Focusing on his position in colonial society, scholars have argued that McKee 
used his position as Crown negotiator to improve his own position in colonial society. Larry 
Nelson argues that McKee used his position on the Land Board to help secure high social status 
in colonial society.
52
 John Clarke, the author of the longest and most in depth discussion of the 
McKee treaty on the other hand, argues that he used his position to improve his own financial 
circumstances.
53
 The idea that Indian Agents like McKee acted in ways that furthered their own 
interests when negotiating land cession treaties is not a new one.
54
 The notable characteristic of 
this literature examining the role of McKee himself, however, is the exclusion of any discussion 
of his work for the Indian Department, or his Indigenous heritage. Nelson’s discussion of 
McKee’s employment by the Land Board for the District of Hesse, despite being part of a book 
that argues for McKee’s centrality in the implementation of Britain’s “Indian policy” in his role 
as a cultural mediator, stands isolated from his discussion of his work for the Indian 
Department.
55
 Clarke on the other hand makes no mention of McKee’s role as the one 
responsible for “Indian policy,” because his study is confined by the artificial borders of Upper 
Canada and the County of Essex on which his work is focused. The only work on McKee and his 
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 Nelson. A Man of Distinction among Them, 133-140. 
53
 John Clarke. Land, Power, and Economics on the Frontier of Upper Canada. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-
Queen’s University Press, 2001), 132-141. 
54
 White, The Middle Ground, 445-6.  
55
 For Nelson’s discussion of McKee’s work for the Land Board see Chapter 7, “Land Acquisition, Public Affairs, 
and politics, 1783-1794,” for his discussion of McKee’s work for the Indian Department at this time see Chapter 8, 
“Indian Affairs, 1783-1794;” Nelson. A Man of Distinction among Them, 133-177. 
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role as a cultural mediator during his employment by the Land Board is the recent biography of 
McKee by Frederick Wulff in which he completely ignores McKee’s involvement in land 
acquisition for the Land Board and the treaty that is named after him. To date no one has 
reconciled these two different sides of McKee in relation to this treaty. 
Work in this vein has failed to keep pace with developments in the study of Native-
newcomer treaties more generally. Like scholarship on treaties specifically, recent work on 
Native-newcomer relations has moved away from a contact history, towards understanding 
Aboriginal peoples on their own terms. For much of the past twenty years, the increasingly 
dominant trend in scholarship on the early-modern history of Native-newcomer relations in the 
Great Lakes region has been an acknowledgement of the centrality of both Aboriginal peoples, 
and the importance of understanding Aboriginal culture. White’s seminal text, The Middle 
Ground is an example of this, placing Aboriginal peoples at the forefront of the story of a search 
for accommodation and common meaning at the point of cultural interaction, and it has been in 
part responsible for this paradigm change.
56
 John Sugden’s biography of the Shawnee chief Blue 
Jacket is another example of scholarship in this tradition. Discussing Blue Jacket, who Sugeden 
argues was one of the most adept Aboriginal diplomats and warriors to have lived, the book also 
provides a good discussion of Aboriginal diplomacy, and the pan-Indianism of the late 
eighteenth century in the Great Lakes Region.
57
 This is a very different approach to histories of 
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 Alan Taylor. The Divided Ground: Indians, Settlers, and the Northern Borderland of the American Revolution. 
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2010. Reprint, New York: Vintage Books, 2011), 11. The title of Taylor’s book is a 
play on the title of The Middle Ground, reflecting Taylor’s different geographic and temporal focus. Similarly, the 
title of Kathleen DuVal’s The Native Ground: Indians and Colonists in the Heart of the Continent, is also a play on 
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 John Sugden. Blue Jacket: Warrior of the Shawnees. American Indian Lives, edited by A. LaVonne Brown Ruoff, 
et al. (Lincoln, NE: University of Nebraska Press, 2000), 4-6. The main manifestation of this late eighteenth century 
Pan-Indianism in the Great Lakes Region was the so called Western Confederacy, an alliance of many of the 
Aboriginal peoples of the Great Lakes Region who banded together in the face of the treat of American incursion 
into their territory. 
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Aboriginal peoples taken by the authors of most of the work that looks at the McKee Treaty, yet 
this is the direction in which future scholarship on the McKee Treaty will have to move.  
Interestingly, the study of this treaty has continued to be defined by the legacy of the 
national history paradigm. With the exception of Surtees, all of the work that has looked at this 
treaty has been limited in scope to the modern province of Ontario. The international border has 
proven just as impermeable to scholarship in the other direction as well. This treaty is largely 
absent from studies of Indigenous-newcomer relations in the Great Lakes that have tended to 
focus on developments in the United States during this time period, despite often discussing 
signatories of this treaty. The one exception to this is Alan Taylor’s The Divided Ground.58 The 
result of this, whether consciously or not, has been the assertion that this treaty can be 
understood in isolation. 
 
Reading the Unwritten Treaty 
This thesis employs an ethnohistorical methodology to explore the understandings of the 
Aboriginal peoples of Detroit, and incorporate them into the discussion of the McKee Treaty. 
Emerging in the 1950s in the field of anthropology, ethnohistory can be broadly defined as a 
multidisciplinary approach incorporating both historical and ethnographic methodologies to 
conduct historical research relating to groups that have left few written records of their history, at 
which point traditional historical methods stall.
59
 This gave birth to what Richard White has 
called the “new Indian history”, which places Aboriginal peoples at its center, placing them on 
                                                 
58
 The McKee Treaty plays a minor part in Taylor’s epilogue, which is focused on Sarah (Sally) Ainse, an 
Indigenous woman who was deprived of land she had purchased by this treaty and subsequent actions by McKee 
and the Land Board; Taylor, The Divided Ground, 396-407. 
59
 James Axtell. “Ethnohistory: An Historian’s Viewpoint”, in Ethnohistory 26, no.1 (1979),  2. 
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an equal footing with their non-Aboriginal peers.
60
 Ethnohistorical methodologies have grown to 
dominate the study of Aboriginal peoples and their histories since the second half of the 
twentieth century. 
The study of Aboriginal-newcomer treaties in common with many topics relating to 
Aboriginal peoples has seen extensive use of ethnohistorical methodologies. In The True Spirit 
and Original Intent of Treaty 7, the authors make extensive use of Aboriginal peoples’ oral 
histories to re-examine Treaty 7, and explore the way in which Aboriginal peoples understood 
the treaty. In doing so they found that Aboriginal peoples’ understanding of the treaty based on 
their cultural understandings differed significantly from the English text of the written treaty 
document, as did what they were told by the translators at the treaty proceedings.
61
 
Situating this treaty as a product of the middle ground, and thus the result of mediation 
between Indigenous and non-Indigenous peoples necessitates that the nature of the treaty be 
reconceptualised, marking a break from past scholarship. Although the signed treaty document 
may be an important part of this treaty, this distinctly western form of knowledge cannot be 
taken as the definitive record of the treaty without further examination. Instead, the meaning of 
the treaty must be reconstructed by examining the understandings of all of the parties involved. 
Doing so requires overcoming specific problems because of the lack of documentation. In many 
ways, the sources that exist are ideally suited to an analysis of non-Indigenous settlement and 
policy, such as that which has been conducted in the past. In common with most early-modern 
Indigenous history, material produced by Indigenous peoples is almost non-existent. 
Furthermore, because the treaty negotiations were conducted in private, there is no record of the 
treaty council to analyze. 
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 White. The Middle Ground. XI. 
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 Treaty 7 Elders and Tribal Council, with Walter Hildebrandt, Dorothy First Rider, and Sarah Carter. The True 
Spirit and Original Intent of Treaty 7. (Montreal & Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1996),  XIII, 324. 
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However, by drawing on a variety of sources by non-Indigenous authors, sufficient 
material can be found for an ethnohistorical analysis of this treaty. McKee’s later correspondence 
with the Land Board includes some discussion of the negotiations that resulted in this treaty. 
Also, the Land Board records themselves do contain a few petitions from individuals that are 
accompanied by the testimony of Indigenous chiefs about this treaty. However, although of great 
value, by virtue of their original intents, these sources are heavily biased towards land related 
issues. It is only incidentally, if at all, that they touch on the relationship between Indigenous 
peoples and the British. To complement these sources that have defined studies of this treaty thus 
far, I have turn to correspondence, official reports, orders and records of treaty councils from the 
Indian department and the civilian and military high command. Well known in the study of 
Indigenous-newcomer relations, this material has been almost entirely ignored by those 
interested in this treaty. However, it provides far more information on the nature of relations 
between Indigenous peoples and the British. This material has been supplemented with similar 
records from the United States relating to American relations with the Indigenous nations of 
Detroit. To develop an understanding of Indigenous understandings, I examined this material in 
conjunction with scholarship on what is known about the cultures of the four Indigenous First 
Nations. 
The remainder of this thesis is divided into a total of three chapters including a 
conclusion. The McKee Treaty cannot be understood outside of its’ Aboriginal cultural and 
political context, therefore Chapter One focuses on the Potawatomi, Wyandot, Ojibwa, and 
Odawa nations of Detroit, individually, and the wider Confederacy to which they belonged. This 
chapter discusses the Aboriginal peoples who signed the treaty. The discussion then turns to the 
larger political entity, the Confederacy, and these peoples relationship with it. In the process, 
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Chapter One explores the continued functioning of “the middle ground,” and highlights the 
Aboriginal aspects that continued to define diplomacy in the so-called pays d’en haut.  
Chapter Two turns to the events surrounding the disastrous treaties signed at Fort Harmar 
a year and a half before the conclusion of the McKee Treaty at Detroit. The failure of the two 
treaties of Fort Harmar, the strength of the Confederacy as an entity, and its cohesion in the face 
of threats to constituent peoples land base are the main elements of this section. Analyzing an 
event that transformed the climate in which the McKee Treaty was negotiated, this chapter 
highlights the repercussions of failing to engage on “the middle ground.” In doing so, the 
Confederacy’s stance regarding the Aboriginal land base in the pays d’en haut, and their 
commitment to the principle of universal ownership of land at the time that Alexander McKee 
was preparing to negotiate the treaty.  
Chapter Three then turns to the McKee Treaty of 1790. This chapter reconstructs the 
negotiation process that produced the McKee Treaty. It is argued that in addition to the four 
named nations of Detroit that signed the Treaty, the parties to this agreement included the 
peoples of the Confederacy more generally. This chapter moves beyond the text of the signed 
treaty document and the surrender of land, highlighting the ways in which the spirit and intent of 
the McKee Treaty can be seen as a treaty of alliance.  
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Chapter 1: Aboriginal Detroit 
 
Know all Men by these Presents, that we the principal Village and War Chiefs of the 
Ottawa, Chippawa, Pottowatomy and Huron Indians Nations of Detroit for and in 
consideration of the Sum of Twelve Hundred Pounds Currency of the Province of 
Quebec at Five Shillings per Spanish Dollar for valuable Wares and Merchandise to us 
delivered by the hands of Alexander McKee, Esquire, Deputy Agent of Indian Affairs, 
the receipt of whereof we do hereby acknowledge, have by and with the consent of the 
whole of our said Nations, given, granted, enfeoffed, alienated, and confirmed and by 
these presents do give, grant, enfeoff, alien, and confirm unto His Majesty George the 
Third, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender of Faith, &c., &c., &c., a 
certain Tract of land.
62
 
These lines, which open the main body of the McKee Treaty of 1790, echo out from 
across the centuries, clearly indicating those who were parties to the written document to follow. 
There is no mystery surrounding the identity and place of King George III and although far less 
well known, there is still a considerable body of work discussing Indian Agent Alexander 
McKee. But who were the “Ottawa, Chippawa, Pottowatomy and Huron Indians Nations of 
Detroit” who also signed the treaty on the 19th of May, 1790  (hereafter referred to as the Odawa, 
Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and Wyandot of Detroit)? This chapter focuses on them. Briefly exploring 
their history, the chapter then turns to a discussion of the political situation in the Great Lakes, 
and the People of Detroit’s place within it. It also discusses the formation of the Confederacy 
among the peoples of the pays d’en haut after the American Revolution. 
 
The Detroit Frontier, 1790 
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Although they are referred to as “Nations of Detroit”, for the most part the Indigenous 
people did not actually reside at the British settlement proper, but were instead residents in the 
general vicinity of that post. The lands included in the treaty were entirely situated within the 
British Province of Quebec, which officially ended at the Detroit River, with the town of Detroit, 
with the fort having been ceded to the Americans in the Treaty of Paris. Extending to some 5,440 
square kilometers, the treaty roughly covered all lands south of the Thames River and north of 
Lake Erie from the base of Long Point to the Detroit River.
63
 In addition, the Treaty also 
included a small, roughly triangular piece of land on the north side of the Thames at the river’s 
mouth, bounded to the north by a line running due east from the mouth of the Channel Ecarté, or 
what is now known as the Sydenham River. In addition to excluding two reserves on the shore of 
                                                 
63
 Dean Jacobs. “Indian Land Surrenders,” in The Western District: Papers from the Western District Conference. 
K.G. Pryke & L.L. Kulisek, eds. Occasional Papers, no.2. (Windsor: Essex County Historical Society; printed by 
Commercial Printing Co., 1983), 64.   
 28 
 
the Detroit River, the also treaty notably excluded all islands on the water bodies that bounded 
this cession.
64
  
On the whole, the nations of Detroit, like the Town of Detroit itself were situated on the 
Western side of the Detroit River, on lands not included in the surrender made to the British in 
1790. The Wyandot are the First Nation that is most associated with the Detroit area, and the 
Wyandot Nation of Anderdon is still present on both sides of the Detroit River to this day. At the 
time of the treaty, they occupied a village almost directly across the river from Detroit. To the 
south they also occupied the mouth of the Rivière-aux-Canards, in what is now the hamlet of 
River Canard at the north end of Amhurstburg, where they maintained extensive cornfields, 
although no more than two families lived there year round.
65
 They also had a significant presence 
on the West side of the River with the village Maguagua in what is today Trenton, Michigan, and 
Brownstown, about 12 kilometres south of Detroit. 
The other peoples of Detroit were more removed from the British settlement, although 
they remained in the vicinity. The Odawa also had a small presence across the river from the 
town of Detroit, including a burial ground. That said, they were largely somewhat more distant, 
with a significant concentration living at the west end of Lake Erie, and in particular 
concentrated at the mouth of the Maumee River.
66
 The Detroit Potawatomi had established three 
new villages the first, on the Huron River near the present day location of Ann Arbor, the second 
on the Salt Fork of the River Basin near Campaign, Indiana, and the last near the modern town of 
Eaton Rapids. Some would also settle in the majority Odawa village on the Kalamazoo River in 
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the vicinity of the modern City of Battle Creek.
67
 The Ojibwa jointly occupied two villages to the 
Northwest of Detroit on the Rouge River with the Potawatomi. In addition, the Ojibwa also had a 
significant presence at the mouth of the Thames River at the southeast corner of Lake St Clair.
68
 
This did not represent the full extent of the Aboriginal occupation of the area at this time. 
One notable exception from the treaty were Caldwell nation of Ojibwa. Living on Point Peele at 
the time of the treaty, their land was thus on included in the cession, signed on the 19
th
 of May. 
They are not however, considered to be one of the four nations of Detroit, although they are 
Ojibwa, and part of the Three Fires Confederacy which also included the Ojibwa, Odawa, and 
Potawatomi of Detroit. They ultimately went unrepresented among the chiefs present at the 
McKee Treaty council, and did not sign the treaty on the 19
th
 of May, 1790.
69
 
Thus, on the whole the four signatory nations were largely resident on what was de facto 
American territory, and not on land ceded in the Treaty. Although these peoples did not 
permanently occupy this territory, they made use of it and its resources at the time of the treaty. 
Along the East shore of the Detroit River, there were important stands of Maple that were used 
for the production of maple sugar.
70
 The Wyandot notably also maintained extensive cornfields 
within this area, and in particular along the Detroit River, within the boundaries of the more 
southerly of the two reserves that would be created.
71
 The remainder of the territory was 
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predominantly covered by swampy Carolinian woodland, and beaver meadow.
72
 The interior of 
what is now the Southern Ontario peninsula was used for hunting, especially by the Ojibwa, 
most of whose hunting camps were located here.
73
 Therefore, although the year-round 
Aboriginal population of this territory was limited, the peoples of Detroit maintained ties to the 
territory and actively made use of it. 
 
Origins 
In order to understand this treaty, it is necessary to understand the Indigenous people of 
Detroit, and the nature of their relationships with each other, and with non-Aboriginal peoples. 
The peoples of Detroit had a long history of interaction with non-Aboriginal peoples, spanning 
over 150 years. All had been active in the fur trade with the French, from the first quarter of the 
seventeenth century on.
74
 Although they would be ravaged by disease, they also enjoyed benefits 
from their trade relationship with the French. However, in the middle of the seventeenth century 
would prove to be a tumultuous period, who had managed to survive and thrive. A series of 
attacks launched against these peoples by their established enemies of the Haudenosaunee 
Confederacy would result in their dispersal from their traditional homes. The Wyandot, Odawa, 
Ojibwa, and Potawatomi Nations of Detroit all grew out of the migrants and peoples in southern 
Michigan after the collapse of more eastern peoples due to Iroquois. 
The wars and forced relocations from Wendake, or Huronia, the traditional homeland of 
the Wyandot peoples in 1649, was the first in a series of events that dramatically reshaped the 
pays d’en haut. Under prolonged assault from their longstanding enemies of the Haudenosaunee 
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Confederacy, the Wyandot finally relented and abandoned Wendake on the shores of Georgian 
Bay, dispersing across eastern North America. Some went east with the Jesuits to the live with 
their allies on the St. Lawrence, the French colony of Quebec. Others sought refuge closer to 
home among other peoples of the pays d’en haut. In 1670 and 1671, the Wyandot and Odawa 
who had fled among the Neutral and Petun resettled in two large villages on Mackinac Island, 
one Wyandot and the other Odawa.
75
 Close to the St. Ignace Mission and Fort de Buade, they 
were able to maintain trade, and alliance with the French at this new location. It was these 
peoples would only coalesce at Detroit at the beginning of the eighteenth century.  
In 1701, Antoine Laumet de La Mothe, sieur de Cadillac returned from France in 
possession of a new trading concession from the King, permitting him the right to establish trade 
along the Detroit River. Problematically for trade however, in the wake of the so called “Iroquois 
Wars” that had seen the destruction of Huronia, the area around Detroit had also been left largely 
uninhabited in comparison to Aboriginal North America more generally in the late-seventeenth 
century. Like the Wyandot of Huronia, the Neutral people had also been targeted by the 
Haudenosaunee and in 1650 they were driven from their homes in what is now the southernmost 
tip of Southern Ontario, between the Thames River and Lake Erie. After the dispersal of the 
Neutral, the Haudenosaunee had turned to the “fire nations” who occupied much of 
contemporary lower Michigan. They also abandoned their lands, leaving much of lower 
Michigan deserted as they headed south and west around Lake Michigan, congregating at Green 
Bay.
76
 The lack of Aboriginal peoples in the area around the Detroit river presented a problem, 
as they were essential for the trade, and Cadillac therefore extended an invitation to the Odawa 
and Wyandot of Mackinac to join him in settling at Detroit, having been acquainted with them in 
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his activities at Michilimackinac. Many Wyandot, along with some Odawa decided to take up the 
offer, and moved to the Detroit River Valley at this time.
77
  
Simultaneously, further to the West, the Potawatomi found themselves under threat, and 
it was at this same time that they would take up residence at Detroit. Fearing that their villages in 
the Lower St. Joseph Valley were vulnerable to Fox and Mascouten raids against their villages in 
the Lower St. Joseph Valley, a sizable number decided to remove to the vicinity of Detroit. 
Establishing a village alongside that of the Wyandot near the shore, by 1718 the Potawatomi had 
become the most populous nation at Detroit.
78
 These nations were joined in the reoccupation of 
this area by the Ojibwa who also decided to move to the area as a result of the French trade post, 
and the valuable opportunities that it offered.
79
 These moves established the beginnings of the 
peoples of Detroit. The peoples of Detroit were on the whole, were still relatively recent arrivals 
to the area in which they resided at the time that the treaty was signed in 1790. 
There has been considerable debate respecting the nature of the communities that 
emerged from the dispersals of established communities during the mid-seventeenth century. 
One argument that has been advanced is that the interaction in the region was essentially two 
sided. Taking place between non-Aboriginal peoples, and a single Aboriginal coalition that 
emerged after traditional polities were destroyed in the conflict. Notable among those in this 
camp is Richard White who argues that in the chaos following the Iroquois Wars, the 
communities that coalesced out of the refugees forged new identities out of necessity.
80
 More 
recently however, it has been argued that a single unified Aboriginal identity did not emerge 
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after the Iroquois Wars. Rather, despite their fragmentation, and the establishment of new 
communities out of the remnants of the old, they retained distinct identities that predated the 
dispersal of many of the peoples in the mid-seventeenth century. Historian Heidi Bohaker has 
notably demonstrated the strong continuity of kinship networks among Anishinaabe peoples such 
as the Odawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi, noting that “[i]f Anishinaabe peoples were ever 
refugees, they certainly were not for long”.81 Although the peoples of Detroit may have 
congregated in villages that included multiple peoples, the individuals within these communities 
retained separate, and distinct identities predating their resettlement at Detroit.  
Although there were some common adaptations to the changed situation, the nations of 
Detroit retained their separate identities, despite their diverse origins. As Andrew Sturtevant 
notes, although the Wyandot and Odawa of Detroit continued their established longstanding 
relationship after their move to Detroit, they retained their cultural and linguistic independence. 
With the Wyandot retaining their Iroquoian language, and the Odawa retaining their Algonquian 
language, the neighbours could only communicate through the use of interpreters. They also 
maintained the different economies to which they were accustomed, and their political 
independence.
82
 In 1738, these differences led to war between these two nations that French 
observers had described as “brothers”, when the Wyandot made peace with the Flatheads.83 
Formerly a mutual enemy, the Wyandot sent warning to the Flatheads when the Odawa launched 
a raiding party, with some of the party sent to warn them joining in the fighting against the 
Odawa. With their distinct identities, the peoples of Detroit also retained their individuality and 
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maintained independent interests that at times meshed, and at others clashed with the interests of 
their neighbours.  
 
The British, 1760 and the Importance of Gift Giving 
During their first half-century at Detroit, the peoples of Detroit were close allies of the 
French. The defeat of the French at Quebec and the Montreal, and the British Conquest of 
Canada in 1760 ultimately brought an end to Detroit’s relationship with the French Crown. 
Despite the French defeat, the peoples of Detroit were not ready to abandon their relationship 
with their French Father, and actively resisted the British. This situation was not helped by 
British policy, at the direction of the Governor General Lord Amherst, that gifts to Aboriginal 
peoples were to be cut. Feeling immense dissatisfaction with the British, and hoping for the 
return of their French Fathers, the peoples of Detroit and beyond expressed their dissatisfaction 
in 1763. Under the leadership of the Odawa Chief Pontiac, many but not all of the peoples of 
Southern Great Lakes, including those at Detroit, united to expel the British.  
The failure of the British to meet the demands of Aboriginal peoples in the Great Lakes 
to continue to provide regular gifts, was a failure to recognize the importance of what Richard 
White has famously referred to as “the middle ground”.84 Although the non-Aboriginal 
population of North America was steadily growing, in the pays d’en haut Aboriginal peoples still 
outnumbered non-Aboriginal individuals and they retained a great deal of power to define the 
manner of interaction. Over the course of more than a century of contact, Aboriginal peoples and 
newcomers, predominantly the French, mediated a system of interaction drawing on both 
Aboriginal and newcomer elements that defined relations in the pays d’en haut. One, although 
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far from the only, key element of this system was the ongoing practice of gift-giving between the 
parties. 
The practice of gift-giving stemmed from pre-contact Aboriginal practices that 
necessitated proof that the words one spoke were true. Despite their long exposure to non-
Aboriginal peoples, and the incorporation of non-Aboriginal goods into their economies, these 
peoples had not become capitalists. To the peoples of Detroit, gifts did not just physical goods 
being transferred from one individual or group to another. Cary Miller notes that “[b]y accepting 
gifts, individuals, regardless of their rank in the community, acquiesced to the ideas, 
commitments, or political agreements that accompanied them.” She goes on to note that “[t]his 
acceptance put one in a position of obligation to the giver”.85 Consequently, rejection of gifts 
constituted a rejection of the messages and obligations associated with them. 
This is significant in the wake of the defeat of the French because, unlike European 
diplomacy, treaties between peoples were not fixed by the signing of a treaty. Rather they had to 
continually be maintained by the parties to remain valid. This is most well known in relation to 
the metaphorical “Covenant Chain” relationship between the British and the Haudenosaunee. In 
the context of this relationship goods, the exchange was referred to as ‘burnishing’ or 
‘brightening’ the silver chain between the allies.86 Failure to continue to renew or burnish the 
chain with gifts over time would result in it breaking. Similar relationships had been essential to 
the French alliance with the peoples of the pays d’en haut. The failure of the British, and 
specifically Lord Amherst to recognize the importance of continuing this practice in the wake of 
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the war with France directly contributed to the disintegration of relations between the British and 
the peoples of the pays d’en haut who had formerly enjoyed an alliance with the French. 
Ultimately Pontiac’s War against the British collapsed with the failure to capture Detroit. 
In the wake of the failure of the conflict to drive out the British, the peoples of Detroit on the 
whole, lived in peace with their British Neighbours, although a considerable number removed 
from the immediate vicinity of Detroit. It was at this time that the Detroit Odawa moved from the 
Detroit River to the west end of Lake Erie.
87
 This was true of the Detroit Potawatomi, who 
abandoned their village at Detroit when it became clear in late October of 1763, that Pontiac’s 
Siege of Detroit would collapse as various peoples returned home.
88
 This contrasted sharply with 
the more westerly Potawatomi peoples who remained strongly opposed to the British presence in 
the pays d’en haut. Looking to the French and Spanish on the Mississippi for support, Western 
Potawatomi remained committed to driving the British out, unlike their cousins at Detroit, who at 
peace with the British, established their new villages in the vicinity of Detroit by 1774.
89
 Such 
differences defined the pays d’en haut before the American Revolution. 
The improvement in relations between many of these people and the British stemmed 
from the hard lessons learned by the British high command as a result of Pontiac’s War, about 
the importance of engaging with the middle ground. The end of the conflict saw the 
reintroduction of gifts to Aboriginal peoples by the British, to maintain their alliances with them. 
This was in no small part the result of the fact that the costs of the conflict for the British had 
considerably exceeded the savings that had been realized by ending the presents in the first 
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place.
90
 This ongoing process of gift-giving would continue to be a hallmark of the relationship 
between Aboriginal peoples and the British into the nineteenth century. It served as testament to 
the power of Aboriginal peoples in the interior, and the importance of engaging in Aboriginal 
diplomacy to fulfill their expectations. 
 
The American Revolution and the Origins of Unity 
The American Revolution brought profound change to the pays d’en haut, and it would 
ultimately see many of the peoples of the interior unite against the United States, in alliance with 
Britain. By and large, Aboriginal peoples really cared very little about the nature of the Conflict 
between the American Colonies and Britain. Few had any real devotion to the Crown and its 
cause, although there were some notable exceptions such as Mohawk Chief Joseph Brant.
91
 The 
War between the British and their rebellious colonies however, offered Aboriginal peoples an 
opportunity to attempt to secure their interests. Many of the peoples of the pays d’en haut slowly 
entered the war on the side of the British, realizing that an American victory would damage their 
interests, and leave their land in jeopardy, believing that victorious British would gratefully 
protect their lands from American settlers.
92
 Others were pushed into the alliance with the British 
in response to the ongoing American raids along the frontier that indiscriminately targeted 
Aboriginal settlements.
93
 Despite the various reasons for allying with the British, the conflict 
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ultimately pushed many peoples into an alliance with each other and with the British. In the 
process, the conflict transformed the pays d’en haut. 
Before the Conflict, the pays d’en haut had been dominated by disparate interests, and 
had lacked any real unity. This can be seen among the Potawatomi. The Western Potawatomi 
continued to actively destroy the British presence in the pays d’en haut, while their brothers at 
Detroit maintained a shaky peace with the British that fell short of alliance. The threat posed by 
the Revolution helped unite these disparate factions against a common enemy, the United States. 
They were not alone, all four of the peoples of Detroit joined the alliance against the United 
States during the Revolution. Joining them were peoples from throughout the pays d’en haut 
including; Shawnee, Lenape, their old enemies the Haudenosaunee. 
Although unity among the peoples of the pays d’en haut would only really begin to 
emerge during the American Revolution, pan-Aboriginal unity itself was not a new idea. The 
Shawnee in particular had been particularly active in trying to organize the peoples of the pays 
d’en haut against external threats and, Gregory Dowd notes; “Although the Indian quest for unity 
intensified during the Revolution, Shawnee embassies to the Cherokees and other southern 
Indians did not represent radical innovations in 1776”.94 Throughout the eighteenth century, the 
Shawnee promoted ideas of pan-Aboriginal unity, much to the dismay of the British and the 
French.
95
 These ideas had coalesced by the 1720s, and in the Seven Years War Shawnee along 
with militant factions of the Creek and Cherokee took concerted action.
96
 There had therefore 
been ideas of pan-Aboriginal unity, and even united elements among the peoples of the pays d’en 
haut well before the Revolution. 
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Despite the fact that they were broadly united in a confederacy allied to the British 
against the American colonists, local considerations remained of primary importance before the 
wider struggle. Richard White argues that “[w]hat the pays d’en haut, in fact, consisted of until at 
least the mid-1780s was distinct villages and settlements”.97 Throughout the war, it was 
repeatedly made clear that imperial demands put the British at the mercy of the local political 
realm. It took continual British prodding, and large volumes of presents to get the peoples of the 
pay’s d’en haut to continue their war with the Americans. Arguing the point, White points to 
Henry Hamilton who, in 1778, gave in to some elements of Aboriginal diplomacy in order to 
secure local peoples alliances with his weak forces against the United States, but censored any 
that he felt undermined the good order and discipline of the military. These failures to meet the 
standards that were expected by the local peoples were met with resentment and complaints from 
the Aboriginal peoples, and ultimately Hamilton was forced to capitulate.
98
 With relatively few 
troops in the interior, he needed alliances with these Aboriginal peoples to maintain British 
control over the region, and to counter the actions of the Americans under George Rogers 
Clarke. Hamilton was thus forced to abide by local expectations and fulfill local demands to 
unite them against the Americans. 
The end of hostilities between Britain and her former American colonies was formalized 
in 1783 in the Treaty of Paris. Yet, although it ended hostilities between the two principal 
combatants, the treaty specifically excluded Aboriginal peoples, who therefore remained at war. 
Although British representatives at the negotiations had attempted to discuss the issue and reach 
a settlement, representatives of the colonies refused to address the issue. In the interests of 
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reaching a settlement, the British gave in to the demand, and dropped the issue.
99
 Thus, despite 
the fact that Britain was no longer at war with the newly recognized United States, the 
confederacy of Aboriginal peoples that had formed alongside her against the United States in the 
pays d’en haut was. Despite the obvious strain that this put on the alliances, they did not break. 
The threat posed by the United States continued, only became more immediate after the 
secession of hostilities between Britain and her former colonies. Although no treaty had been 
signed concluding the conflict between the United States and the Aboriginal confederacy in the 
pays d’en haut, there was a marked decline in the level of violence on the frontier. Near bankrupt 
after years of War, the Colonial government did not continue to actively wage war against these 
peoples. The Confederacy too was indignant that they had been left out of the Treaty of Paris, 
and powerful factions within the Confederacy advocated the negotiation of a peace with the 
Americans. In this they were aided frequently by the urgings of officers of the British Indian 
Department, including Col. McKee through the late 1780s.
100
 With some well-respected and 
highly influential chiefs taking this view, they were able to convince many warriors to stop 
fighting for the time being to afford them the opportunity to negotiate.
101
 
That said, the conflict did not come to a stop entirely. The ink on the treaty was hardly 
dry when, in March of 1783, a party of Chickamauga travelled to Detroit to request British 
assistance in fighting “the rebels”.102 They were not alone, and throughout 1783, other militant 
peoples in the Ohio continued fighting the Americans. This was aggravated by the fact that the 
end of the conflict was accompanied by a surge of Americans seeking free land on the frontier 
which they could only obtain by taking Aboriginal lands. In addition to these individuals, 
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governments were also desperate for Aboriginal land in the pays d’en haut after the war. For the 
near bankrupt American Federal government Aboriginal land was a commodity that could be 
offered for sale to help pay down the debt accrued during the war. It also offered them a way of 
compensating those who had served in the armed forces during the conflict. 
In the pays d’en haut, the American government and its officials possessed no more 
control over American frontiersmen than Aboriginal chiefs did over the warriors of their 
respective nations. Americans were also continuing low-level warfare along the frontier, fighting 
Aboriginal peoples. Understandably indignant at these occupations, Aboriginal peoples pushed 
back, raiding such frontier settlers, who in turn raided to disrupt the “Indian menace”. Reporting 
to the Secretary of War Governor St. Clair noted; “Though we hear much of the Injuries and 
depredations that are committed by the Indians upon the Whites, there is too much reason to 
believe that at least equal if not greater Injuries are done to the Indians by the frontier settlers of 
which we hear very little.”103 These frontier settlers were joined in their fight by a number of 
states who, acting outside the authority of the Federal government dispatched state militia forces 
to fight Aboriginal peoples. Kentucky for example sent militia forces against the neutral 
Mequashake Shawnee who favoured negotiating with the Americans over continuing the 
conflict.
104
 Thus in reality, there was an ongoing and bidirectional cycle of violence throughout 
the year kept the situation tense, and relations strained between the parties for which neither 
alone was to blame. With each side feeling that it had been wronged and needed to fight to 
defend their interests the peoples on the Frontier were engaged in a cycle of tit for tat violence. 
Despite their sincerity, there was little hope for those who favoured negotiating with the 
Americans. Although the American government could not afford to continue the military 
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campaign against the peoples of the pays d’en haut, they never the less asserted ownership of the 
lands on the south side of the Great Lakes by right of conquest. In the Treaty of Paris, the border 
of the United States was recognized by the British as running through the middle of lakes 
Ontario, Erie, Huron, and Superior, and from there over as far as the unidentified headwaters of 
the Mississippi, and from there along the center of the river.
105
 On the basis of this the United 
States claimed these lands as American, as Britain had ceded claim to them. Yet, on the basis of 
this treaty, they claimed that they possessed full ownership of these lands, and that Aboriginal 
peoples had no rights to them. Their contention was that the Aboriginal lands of the pays d’en 
haut had been ceded to the Crown by Aboriginal peoples prior to the revolution, and thus, by 
Britain ceding all claims to these lands to the United States, they were the only true owners.
106
 In 
practice, this meant that the United States refused to consider any agreement with Aboriginal 
peoples of the Great Lakes that did not recognize their ownership of the full extent of this 
territory.  
Yet, as Richard White has written, “[t]he theory of conquest foundered on the weakness 
of the new republic.”107 Lacking the ability to impose this interpretation on the peoples of the 
pays d’en haut in the aftermath of the Revolution, the near bankrupt American Government 
decided to pay lip service to the Aboriginal peoples and their claims by signing a series of 
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treaties that would also end the ongoing war that was further draining finances. The Government 
of the United States was in a tricky spot. Heavily in debt and lacking the ability to tax, they 
needed Aboriginal lands. The United States attempted to make peace with the Aboriginal peoples 
of the Confederacy and implement their claims to these Aboriginal lands in the pays d’en haut, 
and have them recognized by Aboriginal peoples by concluding a number of treaties with them 
recognizing their terms. The first negotiations took place at Fort Stanwix in 1784, the site of the 
far more famous treaty sixteen years earlier. Like its more famous predecessor, the 1784 treaty 
was concluded with the Haudenosaunee. In effect, it simply recognized the extent of the lands 
that the Americans claimed. The Treaty of Fort Stanwix was followed the next year by the 
Treaty of Fort McIntosh with Wyandot, Lenape, Ojibwa, and Odawa representatives. In 1786 yet 
another treaty was signed, this time with the Shawnee at Fort Finney. In each of these cases the 
terms of the treaties themselves were not so much negotiated between the parties as dictated by 
the Americans to meet their needs. All of the treaties recognized the full extent of the land claims 
made by the United States. 
Thus, despite the fact that the war that had precipitated the formation of the alliance with 
the British and the creation of a wider Aboriginal Confederacy had ended, a threat to the peoples 
of the pays d’en haut remained around which they could organize. Facing this ongoing, 
indiscriminate aggression by individuals on the frontier outside of the control of the American 
Government on the one hand, and the Government’s inflexible position that Aboriginal lands had 
been forfeited by right of conquest, the peoples of the pays d’en haut remained relatively united. 
This threat formed the basis of their unity during this period following the end of the American 
Revolution. It would provide a base on which the peoples of the pays d’en haut could unite 
amongst themselves to an extent not seen before, changing the nature of the Confederacy. 
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Unity  
In the face of the ongoing American threat to Aboriginal lands, efforts began to unite the 
peoples of the pays d’en haut into a more unified Confederacy against the Americans. Aboriginal 
peoples maintained that the land in the interior remained theirs. In 1785 the peoples of the 
Haudenosaunee “lighted a Council fire at Buffaloe Creek, expecting that all our western Brethren 
from every quarter would be present”.108 They had received word from the United States that 
they would negotiate with them to secure a treaty, and had subsequently informed the other 
peoples allied against the Americans. However, as they assembled, they found many of the 
western peoples to be absent. It was felt however, that “The Business… was a matter of Such 
high importance to all of us of the Same Colour,” that those in attendance including the 
Haudenosaunee, “thought it unprecedent and to presumtuous to go on with it, whilst one Single 
Representative Should be Absent”.109 They then sent word to other peoples, before reconvening 
at Wakatomica in May, with Shawnee, Mingo, Lenape, and Cherokee in attendance, at which 
point they sent word to the Americans that: 
According to the Line Settled by our Forefathers the Boundary is the Ohio River, but you 
are Coming on the Ground given us by the Great Spirit. we wish you to be Strong and 
keep your people on that side the River… We remind you that you will find us all the 
people of our colour in this Island Strong, Unanimous, and Determined to Act as one 
Man in defence of it.
110
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The warning went unheeded, and the United States continued to push for more Aboriginal land, 
and made no difference to the “negotiations” at Fort Stanwix and Fort McIntosh. 
The peoples of the Confederacy relit the council fire on 18 October, 1786 at the Delaware 
Village, with the Haudenosaunee, Wyandot, Lenape, Shawnee, and Odawa in attendance. The 
council was called after two more sweeping land cessions with the United States had been signed 
with various peoples, and in the wake of a disastrous serious of events at their original meeting 
place when “the Americans fell upon Wakitamiky (Wakatomica) village by surprise, killing 
some of the Chiefs and Young men, and taking of some men women, and children prisoners”.111 
This violence occurring despite the signing of two treaties, one each in 1785 and 1786 that had 
been meant to end the conflict. In council they resolved to “adopt the easiest and most reasonable 
mode of settling our present discontentments with the Americans [sic].”112 The issue had been 
discussed previously by some of those in attendance, principally the Haudenosaunee and 
Wyandot, at a previous council held at Sandusky. In council at the Delaware Village, the 
Confederacy largely reaffirmed the adoption of concepts that had previously been agreed to at 
Sandusky. Foremost was the idea that “when Anything of importance requires our exertions that 
they may be general and united [sic].”113 Thus, they forged a more unified Confederacy. 
Whereas previously, the peoples of the confederacy had been generally united against the United 
States, the adoption of this concept required that all-important business of a nation required the 
consent of the others. The Confederacy then proceeded to appoint deputies who were to act as 
speakers on their behalf, “to go to all the nations both Southward and Westward to make them 
acquainted with our resolutions, and to require them to be in readiness and to assemble by the 
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time appointed, to defend themselves & their rights if necessity requires”.114 If necessity 
required, they would take steps to defend themselves and their lands by attacking the Americans. 
Extinguishing the council fire at Detroit, the peoples in attendance resolved to rekindle 
the council fire once again, with more nations in attendance so that they could determine a 
course of action. On the 18
th
 of December the council fire was relight at the Wyandot Village of 
Brownstown, near Detroit. Those who would congregate at Brownstown included the 
Haudensonee, Wyandot, Lenape, Shawnee, and Odawa who had been present at the previous 
council fire at the last council, as well as Miamis, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and refugee Cherokee.
115
 
With more nations assembled, they affirmed their acceptance of the same principles of unity that 
had been discussed in October. On affirming the adoption of these ideas, they then proceeded to 
actualize this, sending a letter to the Congress of the United States outlining the principles that 
had been agreed, and demanding that the United States treat with the Confederacy as a whole 
rather than with individual peoples.  
Although the Confederacy as a whole had come to a decision about the way forward, and 
a framework for unified action, they remained a collection of peoples than a unified confederacy. 
In many ways it was still a collection of many actors each pursuing their own interests. The 
Chiefs of the Confederacy were unable to compel individuals from their own peoples or others to 
take specific action. They relied purely on their powers of persuasion and mutual agreement to 
determine the course of events. This was plainly evident in the turmoil of the 1780s. Although 
many chiefs hoped to reach an acceptable peace with the new United States through diplomatic 
negotiation, and ultimately a treaty, many of the warriors remained convinced by the actions of 
the American frontiersmen that the only way forward was to continue to fight. The Chiefs of the 
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confederacy were able to convince the warriors to hold off their planned raids for the time being 
to prevent a violent incident from interfering with the process. They were not however, able to 
do so indefinitely, and if negotiations did not take place by the spring, raids against the 
Americans would continue.
116
 
These calls for unity amongst the peoples of the Confederacy, and for acting as a whole 
rather than disparate parts, was not limited to dealings with the United States. Six days after the 
conclusion of their Council at Brownstown, representatives of the Confederacy travelled the 
short distance to Detroit, to meet with Col. McKee in his role as the Deputy Indian Agent. In 
council at Detroit they requested that the British clarify their position in relation to the 
Confederacy, and their ongoing conflict with the Americans. Presenting their position as a 
unified body, they demanded that the British also respond to them as such, rather than conduct 
relations with individual peoples of the Confederacy separately.
117
 This marked a progression in 
their push for more formalized relations with the British. At the council in October the 
Haudenosaunee under Brant had requested that the Wyandot remove themselves from Detroit 
and the immediate presence of the British, and politically reorient themselves around 
Brownstown.
118
 This they had accomplished by December when the council fire of the 
Confederacy was rekindled there. 
 By the end of 1786, the peoples of the pays d’en haut were united in a Confederacy 
specifically to resist the threat posed by the newly independent United States. This united 
Confederacy differed from the alliance that had emerged during the American Revolution in that 
                                                 
116
 Indian Council, 24 December 1786, in Collections and Researches made by the Pioneer and Historical Society of 
the State of Michigan, Vol. XI, 471.  
117
 Ibid, 470-471. 
118
 “Copy of the Transactions between the Five Nations & the Western Indians, at there late meeting in the Indian 
Country”, Papers relating to the Western Indians and Indian Affairs at Detroit, Mchilimackinac &c. 1771-1885, RG 
10 A3d, Reel C-1224, Library and Archives Canada. 
 48 
 
it was less intimately connected to the British, and the alliance with them. Instead, it revolved 
more around the threat posed by the United States. 
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Chapter 2: The Treaty of Fort Harmar, 1789 
 
The unity of the Confederacy, and their resolve to protect Aboriginal lands was put to the 
test in the winter of 1788-1789. After a year of petitioning the American Government to meet 
with them in an effort to finally bring about an end to the conflict between the Western 
Aboriginal Nations and the United States that had been excluded from the Treaty of Paris 
concluding the American Revolution, they were finally able to meet in a council in December 
and January of the Winter of 1788-89. From this council held under the guns at Fort Harmar, 
there emerged two controversial and divisive treaties that ultimately prompted the escalation of 
the conflict in the pays d’en haut rather than stop it.  
The disastrous failure of the treaties of Fort Harmar in 1789 is crucial in understanding 
geopolitics in the pays d’en haut in 1789-1790. The fallout from these treaties shaped the 
environment in which the McKee Treaty was signed a year later. The treaties themselves were 
born of factionalism within the Aboriginal Confederacy, continuing a long tradition of treaty-
making between Americans and some peoples of the pays d’en haut. The fallout from the signing 
of the treaties however, clearly demonstrates the power of the Confederacy as a force to protect 
Aboriginal land and attempts to maintain unity against external threat. In doing so, these treaties 
made it clear that the Confederacy was committed to the principle of collective ownership.  
 
The Concept of Collective Ownership 
The council held at the Detroit Wyandot village of Brownstown in 1786 was highly 
important in the history of the Confederacy because it marked the adoption of a number its’ 
central tenants. Of particular importance to this discussion was the adoption of the concept of 
common ownership. Prior to the adoption of this policy, individuals had protested that they did 
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not possess the authority to make the sweeping land cessions that the American demanded. At 
Fort Stanwix in 1784, Joseph Brant stated that, “we must observe to you, that we are sent in 
order to make peace”, furthermore, “we are not authorized, to stipulate any particular cession of 
lands”.119 Despite such protests, the Americans insisted on concluding land cessions with the 
boundaries they set, and they came away with signed treaty documents that recognized the 
surrender of the full extent of the land that they had demanded. Opposition during these land 
cessions was based on the fact that the Aboriginal peoples in attendance had arrived for the 
purpose of negotiating peace, not land surrender. They did not have the authority from their 
respective First Nations to negotiate territory. Regardless of their protests, the Americans forced 
the Aboriginal people in attendance to sign the land cessions. Consequently, the concept of 
universal ownership that was formalized at the council in 1786 was a direct response to these 
treaties. 
The Indigenous people sent as representatives to meet with the Americans on behalf of 
the Confederacy rejected the Treaties of Fort Stanwix and Fort McIntosh, although the 
Americans insisted they were valid. In response to the threat that such treaties posed to the land 
base of the peoples of the pays d’en haut, it was agreed that action needed to be taken to prevent 
similar treaties in the future. Reflecting on the past, the Haudenosaunee argued;  
Take but a cursory view of that large tract of Country between our present habitations & 
the Salt water, inhabited by the Christians; and consider the reason why it is not still 
inhabited by our own colour- It is certain that before Christian Nations visited this 
Continent, we were the Sole Lords of the Said? We were the Lords of the Said, the great 
Spirit placed us there! and what is the reason, why we are not still in possession of our 
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forefathers birth Rights? you may safely say because they wanted that unanimity which 
we now so Strongly and repeatedly recommend to you [sic].
120
 
They therefore proposed that the Confederacy have; 
unanimity in our Councils on matters that concern us all, if we make a war with any 
Nation, let it result from the great Council fire, if we make peace, let it also proceed from 
our unanimous councils but whilst we remain disunited, every inconvenience attends us. 
The Interests of Any One Nation should be the interests of us all the welfare of the One 
should be the wellfare of all the others [sic].
121
 
Ultimately the suggestion was adopted by the council, thus requiring that the consent of all of the 
Confederacy, and not just the people who occupied a particular parcel of land were required to 
consent before that land could be ceded. 
The effect of this was that they asserted a principal of common ownership of all 
Aboriginal lands held by the First Nations of the Confederacy. This did not mean that they 
understood everyone’s stake in all territory of member communities within the Confederacy to 
be the same. They continued to recognize different rights of use to specific land held by different 
communities. Rather, independently of rights to usage and occupation belonging to individuals 
or communities, the Confederacy at large held an interest in all Aboriginal lands. Without the 
acquiescence of all peoples of the Confederacy, treaties were to be held invalid and non-binding. 
As they made clear in their letter to the Congress of the United States in 1786, this was to 
form not only the basic framework for future treaty-negotiations, it was also to be retroactive. 
The Confederacy specifically rejected the 1784 Treaty of Fort Stanwix and the Treaty of Fort 
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McIntosh (1785). In doing so, they asserted that those in attendance did not have the authority to 
speak and act on behalf of all of the people involved, or even for the entirety of their own First 
Nations. Instead, they requested that the Americans meet them to negotiate a new treaty with all 
of the people of the Confederacy to end the dispute between them. This position was clearly 
stated in a letter from many chiefs of the Confederacy to the American Governor St. Clair in 
1788. In pursuit of peace, they made an offer to meet in council: 
as we cannot think of going further unless the offer we now make you is agreed to, — 
this is our last and full determination it being what was agreed upon By the Confederate 
Indian Nations that were lately Assembled at the Miami River, and for the true 
performance of which, We the Haudenosaunee and Wyandots will be responsible as any 
Agreement that is now made is by the consent of the Confederacy, and differs widely 
from the Councils held by the Gen
l
. [Butler], which was only with a few nations and 
those not authorized to transact any Business which Concerned the whole, therefore any 
thing that was done with him we lay aside, as we cannot agree to abide to the 
unreasonable demands that were made by him & agreed to by those few who Attended, 
and it must have been well known would never meet with the concurrence of all of us.
122
  
 
This letter with the Americans reaffirmed the Confederacy’s commitment to the principal of 
collective ownership, clearly articulating their position that any land cession treaty that was to be 
concluded for any of their lands required the assent of the entire Confederacy. Furthermore, 
should any such surrender not include the consent of the entire Confederacy be concluded, they 
would refuse to recognize their legitimacy. 
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The Council at Fort Harmar 
The restatement of their position in early 1788 was necessary because of the profound 
delays that dogged the process of treating with the Americans. For some unknown reason the 
letter that had originally been sent to Congress by the Confederacy in December 1786 did not 
arrive in Washington until 18 July 1787. Well past the date that they had anticipated for a spring 
council with the Americans, the chiefs of the Confederacy who were in favour of negotiating 
with the Americans were unable to restrain the warriors from launching raids along the 
frontier.
123
 The continuation of these raids predictably led to a frontier conflict that enraged the 
Americans and threatened any negotiations. In response to the delays and the deteriorating 
situation, the council fire of the Confederacy was relit in early 1788, and they resolved that the 
Confederacy would reaffirm their desire to treat with the Americans. In light of the changed 
situation however, the Confederacy chiefs amended their earlier proposals to the Americans. At 
this point they offered to cede a tract of land to the Americans during the proceedings with the 
hope that this would quell the hostilities between them. Although they did not want to surrender 
land to the Americans, the chiefs believed that they had no chance of making peace with them if 
they outright refused. The proposal was, therefore, presented with the intent of using a smaller 
more acceptable cession to bring about an end to the conflict. 
With American officials in the Northwest possessing no more control over American 
settlers than the Confederacy chiefs, Aboriginal warriors were not solely to blame for the tension 
between the Americans and the Confederacy as they attempted to negotiate a peaceful 
settlement. Nor were the endless delays of the American Government. This situation came to a 
head in July of 1788 when two separate attacks on American troops on the frontier claimed the 
                                                 
123
 White. The Middle Ground. 443.  
 54 
 
lives of fifteen soldiers. In response to this, St. Clair demanded that if any council were to be 
held, it would be held not at the home of the Confederacy’s council fire, but under the guns of 
Fort Harmar.
124
 By removing the council to Fort Harmar from the Muskingum location, the 
Americans were deliberately making a move to seize power over the proceedings. Putting 
Aboriginal peoples at a disadvantage, it gave the Americans a significant amount of control over 
the situation. However, in removing the meeting from the seat of the Confederacy’s fire, this 
relocation to Fort Harmar also served to isolate the chiefs in attendance from the rest of the 
Confederacy. The acquiescence of all peoples of the Confederacy to the agreement would be 
essential for its validity to be upheld. Consequently, this move proved crucial to the conclusion 
of the Treaty of Fort Harmar and the signing of an agreement. Despite these challenges, the 
Confederacy reaffirmed its willingness to meet the Americans in council, even if it did require 
them to travel to the Americans on the Ohio River.
125
  
In November, the Americans once again sent word to the Confederacy to discuss a treaty. 
After having received instructions from Congress, Governor St. Clair was under explicit orders 
that the land he acquired through the treaty process not to deviate from existing treaties “unless a 
change of boundary beneficial to the United States” could be obtained.126 In response, he 
conveyed this position to the Confederacy, asserting that any treaty that did not recognize the full 
extent of the existing cessions would be unacceptable to the United States.
127
 Therefore, although 
the United States had changed its’ position, and was now willing to pay for land that it claimed 
by right of conquest following the American Revolution, they had no intention of engaging in 
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any negotiations that may have been acceptable to the peoples of the Confederacy.
128
 Instead, 
they asserted that the only acceptable option was the reaffirmation of the existing treaties that 
were considered totally unacceptable by the Confederacy’s peoples. Upon receipt of the 
message, all hopes for the successful conclusion of a treaty collapsed. Joseph Brant, one of the 
chiefs who had been most supportive of a treaty, immediately ended all plans to treat with the 
Americans and resolved to return home “by way of Detroit”, along with the Shawnee, the 
peoples from the Wabash river, the Delaware, and some Wyandot.
129
  
Following his decision to turn back, and not meet with the Americans for what was now 
almost certainly a pointless exercise, Joseph Brant sent word to St. Clair gently stating their 
position that: 
Agreeable to our expectations we have met the Shawnese, Delawares, Munsces and 
Mingoes have communicated the purpose of your speeches to what we sent in behalf of 
the Nations that were lately assembled at the Miamis rapids. They are of the same 
opinion with us that nothing more can be done, than what we have offered, at least untill 
such time as the whole of the Confederacy is made acquainted, as any thing that we 
might as individuals do, would be paid little attention to by the whole, as no business of 
consequence is to be transacted without the Unanimous Consent of all Concerned [sic].
130
 
 
Thus reaffirming once again the principle of collective ownership, he reiterated the necessity of 
the unanimous consent of all communities of the Confederacy for the conclusion of an 
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acceptable land cession that would be honoured by all of the Confederacy’s peoples. It should 
have served as a warning to the Americans that their plans would not meet with the acceptance 
of the Confederacy, and would therefore achieve nothing productive if they proceeded with them 
un-amended.  
 
Black Wampum 
Brant had not been able to convince all of the representatives of the Confederacy to turn 
back with him and refuse to meet the Americans in council. Despite the American’s letters to 
them stating their position, some remained hopeful that a compromise could be reached that 
would permit a peaceful resolution to the hostilities. In the end, about two hundred Wyandot, 
Seneca, Tawa, Pottawatomi, Ojibwa, and Soc made the journey to Fort Harmar to treat with the 
Americans.
131
 Although they clung to the hope that they would be able to reason with the 
Americans, their hopes were not well founded. For their part, the Americans were not under any 
similar illusions and had no intention of negotiating with the Aboriginal peoples of the 
Confederacy. St. Clair’s orders regarding the negotiations with the Confederacy effectively 
required him to dictate terms to them that they had already dismissed and deemed unacceptable. 
Thus, the treaty was doomed to failure from the start.  
To add insult to injury, the United States also refused to deal with the Confederacy as a 
single political entity. Instead, the Americans insisted on concluding two separate treaties, 
dealing with what they asserted were two separate issues. One would be concluded with the 
Haudenosaunee and deal with their more easterly lands. The other would deal with the more 
westerly lands of the rest of the peoples of the Confederacy that had previously been surrendered 
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in the Treaties of Fort Stanwix, Fort McIntosh, and Fort Finney.
132
 Thus, the Americans 
attempted to subvert the political entity whose approval would be necessary to confirm the 
Treaty and its ability to actually achieve its aims. 
The United States did attempt to meet the expectations of the Confederacy on one front— 
 Wampum. As discussed previously, gift-giving was a central part of life in the pays d’en haut, 
and crucial in relationships. Wampum was the gift of choice in diplomacy. Presented in the form 
of simple strings or more elaborate woven belts, Wampum beads were traditionally found in two 
colours white and purple. Traditionally fashioned from shell, white was obtained from the North 
Atlantic channelled whelk, and purple from the quahog. These natural beads, which were 
produced by the Indigenous peoples of Long Island, were later supplemented by Italian made 
glass beads. Although other goods could be used as gifts in place of wampum, to seal and affirm 
an agreement, the exchange of wampum, and specifically belts, were standard practice at treaty 
councils among the peoples of the pays d’en haut.133 In the Great Lakes region, words spoken at 
treaty councils had little meaning unless they were accompanied by wampum. Failure to provide 
it implied that the words spoken might simply be coming from the mouth and not from the heart. 
In other words, it implied that the speaker could not be trusted. As a gift, wampum could serve as 
an aid to memory and storytelling, as well as a record of a treaty.  
During treaty council proceedings an Aboriginal speaker would often lay out wampum 
strings or belts in front of him before beginning. Then as he spoke, he would emphasize each 
point or paragraph by picking up a string or belt to affirm the sincerity of the words that he 
spoke. This was then laid at the feet of the individual being addressed, acceptance of the 
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wampum indicated that the message with which it was associated would be considered, and that 
there would likely be a positive answer.
134
 At the council at the Delaware Village for example, 
Haudenosaunee War chiefs, after stating their positions to those assembled, concluded, “Here is 
our belt to confirm our words.”135 This was then repeated by every subsequent speaker. Failing 
to provide the expected wampum was flirting with failure, and was roughly analogous to failing 
to sign a written treaty in the European treaty-making tradition.  
 Wampum, and gifts more generally, were key in serving as a record of agreements, 
similar to written documents. After the council fire was extinguished at the Delaware Village, 
they determined “that all the belts we have now spoke upon shall proceed from this council fire 
to the different Nations and return to the Shawanese as they live the most central.
136
 The purpose 
of this was to inform those in the communities that they travelled to about the messages that 
were spoken in the council. They would inform them of the agreement that had been reached by 
representatives of the nations that met at the Delaware Village. Their storage with the Shawnee 
would continue to serve as a record of the agreements that had been made.  
It has been noted that at the time of the treaty, St. Clair lacked access to white wampum 
and was thus forced to use black wampum to provide wampum to seal the agreement.
137
 The 
colour traditionally associated with war, black wampum was unsuited to the sealing of an 
agreement of peace between the peoples in attendance and the United States. Despite this 
undeniable truth, the effect that this could ultimately have on the treaty is negligible at best. The 
nature of the agreement that the Americans insisted on was so egregious, that killing 
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representatives in attendance remained one of the few ways that they could have made the 
situation worse. Really, the use of black wampum by St. Clair to seal the treaty at Fort Harmar 
served as a poignant symbol of the agreement in its entirety. The conditions brought forward by 
the Americans had been rejected by the Confederacy as a whole, and as Brant had warned when 
he had returned home, they abandoned the talks. There was no way that the cession that St. Clair 
demanded would be accepted, as the cession of the same lands had provoked the council in the 
first place. 
The result, unsurprisingly, were agreements that quickly became utter failures. The 
provisions of the treaties were so distasteful that they failed to secure the support of all the 
Confederacy chiefs who attended the council at Fort Harmar. Among these was the Wyandot 
chief T’Sindatton, who Richard White has called “the most creative of the Indian negotiators 
trying to reach a new accommodation on the middle ground.”138 By the end of the council, he 
had become so disheartened with the agreement that he refused to sign the treaty. Those who did 
sign it, were mostly junior chiefs, making their first appearance at a treaty signing and thus 
lacking the respect required to negotiate on behalf of their communities.
139
 Although they may 
have been desirous of peace, the majority of those who signed the Treaty of Fort Harmar did not 
have the authority to negotiate the surrender of land in exchange for peace. Many of the most 
important chiefs from the nations of the Confederacy had simply refused to attend, turning back 
with Brant before the start of the treaty council. Many representatives from the Wyandot and 
Odawa Nations of Detroit, for instance, attended the council at Fort Harmar, but the most 
important leaders did not. Among the Nations of Detroit alone, Sastaritsie, a principal Chief of 
the Wyandot Nation, and Egushwa, a man who frequently played the role of a major spokesman 
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for the four Nations of Detroit, were notably absent, having also turned back with Brant before 
the start of the council.
140
 This lack of proper representation only further undermined the 
agreement for the Confederacy. 
Predictably, when the news of the treaty and its provisions reached the First Nations of 
the Confederacy, the black wampum was an apt marker of its reception. Expressing the general 
perspective of the treaty in the summer of 1789, one chief stated: 
We now declare that we mean to adhere Strictly to the Confederacy by which only we 
can become a people of Consequence, and are sorry to say that Some of us have done 
Wrong in Attending the American Council last fall, we are United & must turn our faces 
to those encroachers. The Lands belong to us all equally and it is not in the power of one 
or two Nations to Dispose of it [sic].
141
 
The Confederacy quickly mobilized to oppose it, and rejecting its validity out of hand. The 
Shawnees in particular were outraged when they heard the provisions of the treaty. Indeed, upon 
learning of the treaty’s terms that affirmed earlier land surrenders, the Shawnee sent out war 
belts to the other nations of the Confederacy to resume the war that had been on hold during the 
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talks.
142
 Intending that they be circulated among all of the nations of the Confederacy, they were 
issuing a general call to arms to wage war against the Americans. They followed up with these 
threats during a council with members of the Confederacy a few months later. 
In addition to the war belts, they also took one more dramatic step. A delegation was also 
sent to the British at Detroit with the intention of presenting a war pipe to the commanding 
officer, calling the British to openly join in a war against the United States.
143
 The effect of the 
successful delivery of the war pipe could have been transformative, as it would have forced the 
British to choose between maintaining their necessary alliance with the Confederacy and going 
to war with the United States, or losing the basis of their defence of what remained of British 
North America.  
In the end, it was only the efforts of Alexander McKee and a number of chiefs 
Confederacy chiefs that prevented all-out war on the frontier between the British and Aboriginal 
people on the one hand and the United States on the other, as a result of this treaty. Before the 
delegation was able to meet with the commander at Detroit and present him with the war pipe, 
McKee met privately with an influential chief and managed to keep the delegation from 
presenting the pipe.
144
 Thus, the principle of collective ownership, and the failure of subsequent 
treaties to satisfy all communities within the Confederacy led directly to the continuation and 
intensification of hostilities in the Southern Great Lakes between the Confederacy and the United 
States.  
 
Transformations 
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The resulting conflict between the United States and the Confederacy has been frequently 
referred to as the “Northwest Indian War.” Yet, although the two Treaties of Fort Harmar may 
have prompted an escalation of the violence in the pays d’en haut, they did not initiate it; the 
conflict having never totally subsided. It is therefore best conceived as ushering in a new, more 
intense phase of the war. Despite this, it was nevertheless transformative. It had sweeping effects 
on the politics of the pays d’en haut and transformed the nature of relationships between its 
peoples. The mess at Fort Harmar was first and foremost responsible for escalating the conflict 
between the Confederacy and the Americans, while in addition it also prompted radical changes 
within the Confederacy itself and altered the power dynamics within it with the faction that had 
been in favour of negotiations with the Americans largely discredited. Finally, the two treaties 
signed at Fort Harmar, along with the negotiation process clearly demonstrate the importance the 
Confederacy placed on the concept of universal ownership during this time period..  
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Chapter 3: The McKee Treaty, 1790 
At the conclusion of the Treaty council at Detroit in May, 1790, the British secured 
ownership of the lands stretching from Long Point to the Detroit River south of the Thames. In 
stark contrast to American attempts to do the same on the other side of the Great Lakes, the 
British did not just leave the treaty council with a signed piece of paper. Rather, they left with an 
agreement that was recognized by the Aboriginal people of the pays d’en haut and their 
acceptance of non-Aboriginal settlement on those lands. Where the Americans failed, the British 
succeeded. This chapter examines this success through the McKee Treaty, and argues that in 
addition to the British and the First Nations of Detroit, the people of the Confederacy more 
generally were also part of the agreement that was finalized at the council at Detroit. 
 According to the written treaty document, the signatories represented the “principal 
Village and War Chiefs of the Ottawa, Chippawa, Pottowatomy and Huron Indians Nations of 
Detroit”145 The document states that the agreement was one between the Crown and these four 
First Nations. Although, as at most treaty councils, there were likely a number of people gathered 
at Detroit that did not sign the final written treaty, most, if not all, hailed from the four First 
Nations who did sign. Certainly no mention of individuals from further afield is made in the 
documents relating to the negotiations and the conclusion of the treaty at the time. Although far 
from definitive, this strongly suggests that there was not a significant number in attendance who 
had travelled from outside the Detroit area. Yet, despite the fact that this complements the treaty 
document’s text that lists only the four nations of Detroit as parties to the treaty, it does not tell 
the whole story. 
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A Treaty Council at Detroit  
With the Land Board demanding territory, and suitable orders having been issued to Col. 
Alexander McKee to facilitate a cession, a treaty council convened at Detroit for that purpose. 
The Royal Proclamation of 1763 specified that all lands “shall be purchased only for Us, in Our 
Name, at some publick Meeting or Assembly of the said Indians to be held for that Purpose by 
the Governor or Commander in Chief of Our Colonies respectively.”146 Because of this clause in 
the Royal Proclamation, the Aboriginal lands that the Land Board wanted had to be acquired 
from the Aboriginal peoples in a public council held for that purpose by a servant of the Crown. 
This much could theoretically have taken place at a First Nation settlement. The requirement that 
“Governor or Commander in Chief of Our Colonies” preside, however, was more challenging to 
accommodate. The officer commanding the garrison, Maj. Murray of the 60
th
 Foot, was the most 
senior military or civilian official at Detroit, and the area west of Niagara. Although he could, 
and would, preside at the public council with the officers of the garrison witnessing, the nature of 
the duties of these men required the council to be convened at Detroit. McKee, therefore, 
requested that the peoples of Detroit assemble at that post for the treaty council. Unlike the 
Americans who had demanded that a council be held under the guns of Fort Harmar a year and a 
half before, McKee requested the local people gather at Detroit rather than an Aboriginal 
settlement. 
Interestingly, the negotiations surrounding the conclusion of the McKee Treaty are far 
less documented than those at Fort Harmar and other treaties of the period with both the British 
and Americans. It is nonetheless possible to reconstruct the series of events using what material 
survives. The council at which the treaty was signed was held on the 19
th
 of May, 1790 at British 
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Detroit. Present were at least thirty-five Chiefs of the Odawa, Ojibwa, Potawatomi, and Wyandot 
Nations of Detroit. This day, however, saw relatively little negotiation as many of the details had 
already been settled upon. 
May 19
th
  marked the end of two partial days of discussion of the treaty. The assembly of 
the peoples of Detroit at the town was complete by the 18
th
 of the month when the last of the 
Wyandot representatives arrived. With their arrival, McKee and the chiefs worked through some 
other business of importance, unrelated to the cession of land.
147
 Once these details were 
complete, attention turned to discussion of the treaty. At this point McKee and the Officers of the 
Indian Department left the Aboriginal peoples in attendance alone to “Consult with each Other 
respecting the purchase of Land.”148 Reconvening on the 19th, and finding that they had not 
reached consensus on the treaty amongst themselves, McKee sat in with the chiefs to negotiate 
the final terms of the agreement in an additional private council. They emerged from this council 
with the terms of the cession decided. From there they proceeded to the Council Chamber where 
a public council was held to conclude the treaty and those in attendance signed the written treaty 
document.  
The final conclusion of the treaty would have to wait until the next day as the “day being 
too far advanced to accomplish it.” Consequently, they reconvened and signed the treaty. Later,  
on the 20
th
, the peoples of Detroit and McKee, along with some of the officers of the garrison, 
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assembled for the distribution of £1,179 13s. 9d. Quebec currency worth of goods.
149
 These 
“gifts” received by the Peoples of Detroit in exchange for their lands served to seal the treaty for 
these First Nations; similar to the signing of the written document for the British the night 
before. The First Nations then spent the next day on the 21
st
  distributing these gifts amongst 
themselves.
150
 The remaining value that the Peoples of Detroit were owed, to the value of £20 6s. 
3d. Quebec currency, was distributed to them on the 22 May, when McKee provided the them 
with a bullock and 39 gallons of rum for a feast to conclude the treaty council.  
These few days (two partial days) to decide the final terms and sign the agreement do not 
represent the full extent of the treaty negotiations. In reality, the bulk of the negotiations actually 
took place well in advance of this council. On 5 May1790, McKee reported that he had just 
returned from “a Tour into the Indian Country, where I went some time ago to sound and collect 
the Indians on the South side of the Lake, concerned in the purchase to be made from them of 
Land.”151 It was during this journey that most of the negotiations regarding the Treaty were 
conducted. Having conducted no further extensive negotiations with Aboriginal peoples, McKee 
was able to report on the 14
th
, at a meeting of the Land Board for the District of Hesse at Detroit, 
that “the purchase from the Indians would probably be completed within a few days.” At this 
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point all he was waiting for was the Peoples of Detroit to gather at the town, so that they could 
finalize and conclude the treaty.
152
  
 
“A Tour of the Indian Country” 
Throughout the winter of 1789-1790 and spring of 1790, McKee continued to work 
closely with the Confederacy, actively managing Britain’s relationship with them. This 
relationship would serve as the basis of the Treaty. In the spring of 1790 McKee made his final 
visit to the south, where the majority of First Nations of the Confederacy resided. Returning to 
Detroit at the beginning of May, McKee wrote to his superior Sir John Johnson on the 5th, 
reporting that “I am but a few days returned from a Tour into the Indian Country, where I went 
some time ago to sound and collect the Indians on the South side of the Lake, concerned in the 
purchase to be made from them of Land.”153 It is unclear who McKee was visiting with on this 
trip, but he almost certainly met with the Odawa while touring the country. Concentrated at the 
mouth of the Maumee River, their villages were on the south side of the lake. McKee also 
indicates in his journal that he took part in a council during that time.
154
 
 It is unclear who else McKee may have been speaking with in regards the treaty on this 
trip, but the lack of any evidence of opposition to the McKee Treaty, and their earlier insistence 
that the British negotiate with them as a united confederacy suggests that the McKee consulted 
with the First Nations the Confederacy more generally, and not just with the nations of Detroit, 
before concluding the treaty.  
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Although he is less than specific, the language McKee uses is noteworthy. He mentions 
the “Indians on the South side of the Lake.”155 Geographically, the First Nation of Detroit, by 
whom the treaty was signed, had villages concentrated around the northwest end of lake Erie 
near Detroit – not the south. Furthermore, McKee used the term “Indian Country”.156 Although 
the vast majority of the pays d’en haut was in fact still “Indian Country” at this time, in the sense 
that it was Aboriginal land and devoid of any official non-Aboriginal settler presence, use of this 
term by McKee, was most likely in reference to the region south of Lake Erie and not the areas 
in the vicinity of Detroit. In particular, McKee’s earlier and frequent references to “Indian 
Country” concerned his visits his home on the Maumee River. Combined, the terminology 
indicates that McKee tour went beyond the Detroit area and into “Indian Country” to speak with 
other members of the Confederacy. 
This tour is particularly noteworthy because of McKee’s visit to an important political 
site in Great Lakes and the new seat of the council fire of the Confederacy.  After the disaster of 
Fort Harmar, the Council fire of the Confederacy had been extinguished at Brownstown and 
moved South to the Maumee, and a location that was home to many First Nations of the 
Confederacy including the Shawnee, Lenape, Miamis, Mingo, Haudenosaunee, and Wyandot. In 
light of this, it seems that during his spring trip down to “Indian Country” to discuss the 
proposed surrender of land, he sat in consultation with these peoples of the Confederacy rather 
than the nations of Detroit alone. If that was indeed the case, McKee’s “Tour into the Indian 
Country” south of Lake Erie, would have served his interests, ensuring that Confederacy allies, 
who were necessary to the defence of the Province of Quebec, remained intact.  
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Alexander McKee 
In many ways Alexander McKee was the ideal man to fill the post of Deputy Indian 
Agent. Born to a Shawnee mother, McKee was raised in the interior and educated in the ways of 
her people by her.
157
 One of the most politically active and important people in the pays d’en 
haut and the Confederacy at this time, McKee held notable positions such as the keeper of the 
Belts of the Confederacy. This was complemented by the education that he received as a result of 
his Scots-Irish father, Thomas McKee. Records indicate that a tutor was retained to teach the 
young McKee in a number of subjects that would later allow him to operate in the highest circles 
of colonial society.
158
 In addition, McKee had also been afforded a first class education in the 
arts of diplomacy. Working alongside his father at his trading post from a young age, McKee 
learned the ways of Aboriginal diplomacy from a well-loved expert in that art. Accounts suggest 
that Aboriginal peoples from a variety of nations made detours off the most direct routes to their 
destinations to visit the Thomas McKee’s post. Indeed, there are a couple of instances of 
Aboriginal people having taken the elder McKee’s name as a mark of respect. Throughout his 
adult life Alexander McKee spent his time living and working amongst the peoples of the 
Confederacy, making his home at “McKee’s Town” in the heart of “the Indian country” rather 
than colonial Detroit.
159
  
As the agent at Detroit, McKee had also been the point person in dealing with the 
Confederacy throughout the post-revolution period. In the course of his duties it was his 
responsibility keep track of the regional political environment after the war. As a result, he was 
in attendance, or received reports from, all of the major councils held with, or between, the 
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Aboriginal peoples of the pays d’en haut. Knowledge of the council proceedings was essential 
for his role of managing relations with the First Nations. Through this position and his intimate 
understanding of the councils, McKee would have been aware that theoretically any agreement 
reached with one or more members of the Confederacy had support from the rest of the 
Confederacy. This was the case, for instance, when McKee met with Brant and the chiefs of the 
Confederacy in December of 1786. At this meeting, the chiefs demanded that Britain clarify its 
position in relation of the Confederacy and its conflict with the United States. In addition, 
McKee was also involved in the negotiations with chiefs at Detroit that prevented the British 
from going to war with the United States. Finally, McKee witnessed similar circumstances in the 
disastrous fallout from the Treaty of Ft. Harmar where the Americans had attempted to dismiss 
the Confederacy as an entity a year before. Thus, knowing what he did, as the man whose 
responsibility it was to ensure that the same did not happen to the British as had to the 
Americans, the only reasonable step for McKee to take was to raise the issue of the treaty with 
the Confederacy as a whole. 
The winter 1789-90 and the spring of 1790 were a particularly tense time in the pays d’en 
haut. Although it was highly unlikely that a land cession with the British would have the same 
disastrous consequences as the Treaty of Fort Harmar, the various factions within the 
Confederacy continued to worry the British. In the months preceding the treaty there were real 
concerns at Detroit about the alliance with Aboriginal peoples, and the safety of the post. Of 
particular concern in 1789/1790 was the intent of the Wyandot people of Detroit. Although the 
reports would later prove to be false, it was said that the Wyandot were planning to attack the 
post of Detroit. These concerns were given extra credence at the time by the prominence of the 
Wendat/Wyandot among those seeking to improve relations with the Americans through 
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negotiation and away from the close alliance with the British. These concerns were serious 
enough that they made their way by secret intelligence reports to the desk of the Governor 
General Lord Dorchester at Quebec. From there they were subsequently forwarded by 
Dorchester to Whitehall.
160
 This threat meant that McKee, who forwarded word of the perceived 
threat to the British high command, could not afford the chance of antagonizing the Confederacy 
during the period of negotiations that preceded the treaty. 
In spite of these threats, the chances that a land cession to the British could have 
produced results anywhere near as disastrous as the Americans achieved at Fort Harmar were 
slim. This cannot be ascribed to the extent of the area surrendered. Although it may not have 
been as sweeping a cession as the Treaty of Ft. Harmar, at 5,440 square kilometers the treaty still 
represented the cession of a significant amount of land.
161
 Furthermore, it was land which no 
other party had claimed, it was largely unsettled and was under Aboriginal control. As such, it  
was a significant land surrender that the Confederacy could not ignore. Rather, the success of the 
treaty stems from the markedly different relationship between the Confederacy and the British. 
The British and the peoples of the Confederacy, enjoyed fairly amiable relations during this 
period, unlike the frequently hostile nature of their relationship with the United States. Although 
there were periods of tension and uneasiness between individuals, British traders, and officers of 
the Indian Department continued to live among the peoples of the Confederacy. Furthermore, it 
is important to note that the Confederacy had only just begun an entirely new, and far more 
violent phase of their conflict with the United States for control of the pays d’en haut.  
                                                 
160
 Lord Dorchester to Grenville, Quebec, 8 March 1790, in Collections and Researches of the made by the Pioneer 
and Historical Society of the State of Michigan. Vol. 12. (Lansing: Thorp & Godfrey, 1888), 22. 
161
 Dean Jacobs. “Indian Land Surrenders,” in The Western District: Papers from the Western District Conference. 
K.G. Pryke & L.L. Kulisek, eds. Occasional Papers, no.2. (Windsor: Essex County Historical Society; printed by 
Commercial Printing Co., 1983), 64.   
 72 
 
The intensification of the conflict between the Confederacy and the United States was a 
marked departure from the political climate that had emerged in the wake of the American 
Revolution. It was during the Revolution, that Britain served as a key source of arms and 
ammunition for the Confederacy so that they could continue to fight. At times, they also 
provided other essential supplies including foodstuffs to enable the Confederacy to continue to 
fight on. In the event of circumstances where they found British supplies cut off, their only 
option would have been the Spanish on the Mississippi. Although this may have theoretically 
been possible, there were no established networks based around the Mississippi that would have 
allowed the Confederacy to obtain the stores they required while devoting themselves primarily 
to war rather than commerce. Although they were actively involved in trade with the British, the 
Confederacy also received significant amount of presents from the British for which they were 
not required to trade furs or other goods. There was no comparable gift network emanating form 
the Spanish Mississippi.
150
 Thus, the British were an irreplaceable source of supply that the 
Confederacy needed to maintain in order to continue their struggle. Consequently, the 
Confederacy could not afford to make enemies of the British at this time, as doing so would 
leave them without access to arms and ammunition that they required to continue the fight for 
their lands. 
The necessity of maintaining the relationship with the British was particularly acute in 
the spring of 1790. For months before the signing of the Treaty it was well known that the 
Americans were “raising a large body of troops, under color [sic] of completing their 
establishment on the eastern frontier.” The size of the force suggested that although it was raised 
under:  
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The pretense to the public is to repel the Indians… those, who know better, and see that 
an Indian war does not require so great a force, nor that very large proportion of Artillery, 
are given to understand, that part of the forces are to take possession of the frontier, as 
settled by treaty, to seize the posts and secure the fur trade.
162
  
The Americans were planning a full-scale invasion of the pays d’en haut and the Confederacy 
needed to be ready. Without the ability to rely on British supplies, the Confederacy would not be 
able to meet the Americans in the field and resist the invasion. 
 Although the Confederacy could not afford to damage its relationship with their main 
source of supply for war material in 1790, concluding a treaty without the consent of the 
remainder of the Confederacy would still have led to some degree of tension between the various 
First Nations within the Confederacy. Tellingly, there are no hints that any of the Aboriginal 
signatories were dissatisfied with the Treaty in the years immediately following it. There is 
notably no evidence of any complaints having been made to Alexander McKee, for instance. 
This is particularly significant, because if he had received complaints on the matter, they would 
almost certainly have been passed on in his official correspondence. In addition, McKee’s 
defense against the complaints made by the civilian members of the Land Board regarding the 
inclusion of the two reserves that they considered unnecessary and contrary to British interests, 
could certainly have been strengthened by presenting evidence of Aboriginal dissatisfaction with 
the Treaty.  
Opposition to the Treaty was also notably absent in August 1790. At that time Sir John 
Johnson, the Superintendent General of Indian Affairs was on the last leg of his tour of the 
interior posts, having just returned to Detroit from Michilimackinac before going to the St. 
Lawrence. As McKee’s superior officer in the Indian Department, he was in charge of managing 
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Britain’s relationships with Aboriginal peoples in the northern half of North America. In 
response to the ongoing dispute over the inclusion of the reserves in the McKee Treaty, a council 
was held at Brownstown with a number of Aboriginal peoples specifically to discuss the Treaty. 
Although they discussed the extent of the reserves and their utility to the Aboriginal peoples 
concerned, there is a clear lack of any protest over the nature of the Treaty that was negotiated, 
or the way in which the negotiations were conducted.
163
 The lack of any protest about the Treaty 
demonstrates the agreeable nature of relations between the Confederacy and the Crown, in spite 
of the surrender of a vast area. This lack of complaint signifies that the peoples of the 
Confederacy as a whole, and not just the four First Nations of Detroit, acquiesced to it. 
 
The Lakes Confederacy 
The transcript of the public treaty council held on the 19 May 1790 provides tantalizing 
hints about this, but is frustratingly cryptic. What is clear is that the Treaty was concluded with 
the assent and agreement of more than simply the four First Nations of Detroit.  
At the public treaty council the main speaker was the Odawa chief Egushwa. A well 
respected leader amongst all of the peoples of the western lakes and the Maumee River, he 
frequently spoke with authority on behalf of his own Odawa people, as well as Ojibwa, and 
Pottawatomi, and occasionally the Wyandot.
164
 The McKee Treaty council was no exception, 
and on this occasion he was the main Aboriginal speaker at the public treaty council. On this 
occasion he spoke on behalf of numerous peoples, but it is unclear how many. The transcript of 
the public treaty council notes that “E.gouch.e.ouai. Chief of the Ottawas in the name of the Lake 
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Confederacy arose and Spoke” to those assembled.165 Yet, the term “Lake Confederacy” is not 
clear and could refer to two separate bodies. The smaller of the two, on whose behalf he was 
certainly qualified to speak for was the people commonly referred to as the “Lake Indians.” The 
so-called “Lake Indians” included the Aboriginal peoples of Detroit with the notable exception 
of the Wyandot, the Potawatomi further to the west at Saint Joseph, as well as the Aboriginal 
peoples at Saginaw, in the villages from Arbre Croche to Michilimackinac.
166
 Yet despite this, 
other contemporary British and American documents refer to them as the “Lake Indians,” and 
not the “Lake Confederacy.” This is an interesting, but inconclusive, distinction because the term 
“confederacy” seems to imply a greater degree of official unity as oppose to “Indians.” 
Yet, we do know that the “Lake Indians” represented one of the key constituents of the 
larger Confederacy in the years after the American Revolution. It possible, then that Egushwa 
was speaking on behalf of the Confederacy more broadly. Although often referred to in 
correspondence as the “Western Indians” by McKee, another Indian Department officer, Isadore 
Chene, was designated to translate at the council, and signed each page of the transcript of the 
public treaty council, on which he translated Egushwa’s speech. The term “Lake Confederacy” 
in this instance may have been intended to refer instead to an older name used for the alliance 
between the peoples of the pays d’en haut, and the Western Lakes Confederacy. This was the 
name by which the Western peoples were referred in 1764 during the Treaty of Niagara.
167
 This 
may, therefore, have plausibly been used to refer to the wider Confederacy in 1790. 
It is therefore unclear the full extent of the nations on whose behalf Egushwa was 
speaking when he rose on 19 May 1790 in the name of the “Lake Confederacy.” Although it can 
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be asserted that at the very least he was speaking on behalf of all of the nations of Detroit, with 
the exception of the Wyandot. The Detroit Odawa, Ojibwa, and Pottawatomi all formed part of 
the “Lake Indians” at this time. In turn, the constituent peoples of the “Lake Indians,” effectively 
represented most of the members of the Confederacy north of the Maumee River. Although the 
Wyandot were an important people within the Confederacy, the fact that Egushwa was not 
speaking on their behalf in this instance is evident from the third part of his address, which is 
directed to the Wyandot, rather than to the British officials.
168
 
 This would not pose a problem for McKee and his quest to conclude the Treaty. Col. 
McKee was able to negotiate the Treaty as he saw fit because of his role as the Indian Agent at 
Detroit. Although he also held military rank, a captaincy in the Detroit Militia, his service as a 
colonel the Indian Department placed him outside of the military and civilian chain of command 
at Detroit. Orders issued to the Indian Department’s officers in 1787 stipulated that “When 
public conferences are held at any of the Posts between the Agents residing there and the 
Indians. the Commanding Officer shall preside, attended by all the Officers of the Garrison.”169 
Notably, this order only included the public councils, and not those held in private. It goes on to 
state that even then, “[the Commanding Officer] is not under pretence of this regulation to 
interfere with the Agent on the management of the Indian Department.”170 Thus, the Indian 
Agent was granted sole authority for negotiating with Aboriginal peoples. Indeed, the exclusion 
of the post commander Major Patrick Murray from the private treaty councils held on the 18
th
 
and 19
th
 of May, and those consultations held earlier to the south of the Lake meant that McKee 
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was the only British representative who was consistently present during the negotiations, which 
Major Murray freely admitted.
171
 Even if he had not been, the standing orders issued to the 
military and the Indian Department’s officers prohibiting regular army officers from interfering 
in councils meant that he had complete control over the negotiations. McKee did fall into the 
chain of command within the Indian Department, although as he was the most senior Indian 
Department officer present in the pays d’en haut at the time of the Treaty. His superior officer, 
Sir John Johnson, spent the majority of his time in the east, leaving McKee almost entirely 
unsupervised. In essence, this gave McKee and other officers of the Indian Department the 
power to shape British policy towards the Confederacy in the pays d’en haut.172   
 More challenging is the fact that all the representatives of the Confederacy did not attend 
the final treaty council, and subsequently sign the treaty. Yet, it is clearly indicative of the 
profound changes that the Confederacy was undergoing in the wake of the Treaty of Fort 
Harmar. It is a manifestation of the failure of Joseph Brant’s vision of the Confederacy’s 
relationship with the British. On the basis of the idea, first asserted in 1786, that “when Any 
thing of importance requires our exertions that they may be general and united [sic]”, the 
Confederacy as a whole should have engaged in discussions regarding the Treaty.
173
 In light of 
the subsequent demand made to McKee in December, 1786 that Britain treat with them as a 
unified Confederacy rather than as independent nations, this should have led to representatives of 
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the Confederacy being present at Detroit for the conclusion of the Treaty.
174
 Instead, however, 
only the four nations of Detroit signed the Treaty on the 19
th
 of May. 
 The treaties concluded by the Americans, including those at Fort Harmar, similarly did 
not bare the signatures of representatives of all the Confederacy. In looking at these agreements 
with the United States, and their failure, it is important to note that Aboriginal signatories did not 
protest the validity of the treaties because of a failure of all the nations to be represented, but 
rather, because the individuals in attendance did not possess the authority to agree to the final 
terms that they did. As previously discussed, almost all of the chiefs who signed the Treaty of 
Fort Harmar were making their first appearance at a treaty council. Those present at the 
conclusion of the McKee Treaty, however, included many of the most important and experienced 
chiefs at Detroit. Egushwa, for instance, was one of the most influential chiefs at Detroit and 
played a prominent role during the negotiations and was a signatory. As did Sastaritsie, who 
“could be called the Grand Chief of the Wyandot.”175 Among the Ojibwa, Wasson was also a 
signatory of the Treaty, and featured prominently in regional affairs since Pontiac’s War. Many 
of the other chiefs who signed the Treaty had previously signed treaties with the British Crown 
or the Americans, or had signed deeds to land in the Detroit region.
176
 The local importance of 
these individuals suggests that the signatories of the McKee Treaty had the authority to negotiate 
on behalf of their people.  
Provided the people on the Maumee agreed to the cession, the local First Nations could 
have proceeded to cede it without the rest of the Confederacy in attendance at the council. The 
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Confederacy never asserted that all First Nations enjoyed equal rights to all lands held by the 
First Nations of the Confederacy. Their common interests in the lands of the Confederacy only 
recognized the necessity of the Confederacy as a whole agreeing to a cession of land. They did 
not gain other rights of usage, or interest in the value of it should it be sold. This might explain 
why it was only the people of Detroit who were to share in the 1200 pounds Quebec currency 
worth of goods that were presented in exchange for the cession.  
The Confederacy’s concept of universal ownership was complex and a relatively new 
idea. In general the British considered Aboriginal ownership to be related to occupation or use of 
lands in question. Thus, this also explains why the British would not have required all the First 
Nations of the Confederacy to be among the signatories. To the British, ownership was 
determined by the possession of various rights to the land, and it was only the Nations of Detroit, 
and not the peoples of the Confederacy more generally who had use of the land in question. Only 
the Indian Department’s Officers and traders in the pays d’en haut would have fully understood 
the Confederacy’s conception of collective ownership that did not directly equate to a concept of 
ownership within British common law. Therefore, it would not be necessary to alienate rights 
from these people when transferring the land to the Crown. 
The success of the McKee Treaty stemmed from the willingness of Alexander McKee, 
and by extension the British, to meet the needs of the Confederacy, and negotiate effectively 
with the peoples of the Confederacy. Ultimately, the Confederacy as a whole and not just the 
Nations of Detroit were a party to the Treaty. Given the assertion of collective ownership made 
by the Confederacy, and their actions taken to dismiss treaties made without the unanimous 
consent of the peoples of the Confederacy, they must have agreed to the peaceful, and 
unchallenged McKee Treaty. The absence of several members of the Confederacy in the treaty 
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document, do not dismiss the possibility that they had already accepted the treaty agreement 
before the signing. Indeed, the idea that the Confederacy at large was not consulted before the 
treaty was concluded is almost unthinkable. From the end of the American Revolution until after 
the War of 1812, the British relied on Aboriginal allies to defend British North America. No one 
was more keenly aware of this Alexander McKee. As the Deputy Indian Agent at Detroit, his 
primary occupation was monitoring and managing the Crown’s relationship with the Aboriginal 
peoples of the pays d’en haut. 
 
Spirit and Intent 
Father. You have told us that you have received Letters from our Father the 
General, and our Father Sir John Johnson acquainting you that our Father the 
Great King had written to them, to know if We would cede him a Piece of Land 
extending from the from the other side of the River to the line of that ceded by the 
Messesagez. 
Father, Is there a man amongst us who will refuse this request? What man 
can refuse what is asked by a Father so good and so generous, that he has never 
yet refused us any thing? What Nation? None Father!
177
 
With these words, the Odawa chief Egushwa publically announced that the People of Detroit 
granted all unceded Aboriginal lands between the Thames River and Lake Erie to the British. As 
he did this, Egushwa placed great emphasis on the established relationship between the 
Aboriginal people in attendance on whose behalf he spoke and the British Crown. This 
relationship was of great importance in the wake of the events at Fort Harmar in 1789. The 
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McKee Treaty of 1790 was born of, and is inextricable from, the greater realities of the time and 
place it was crafted. The Treaty functioned as an integral part of this world, and the ongoing and 
developing relationship between the British and the peoples of the pays d’en haut. In addition to 
serving as a land cession to fulfill the needs of the Land Board for the District of Hesse, the 
evidence of this thesis proves that it also functioned as a treaty of alliance between the 
Confederacy and the Crown. 
 The final document signed at Detroit on 19 May deals only with the issue of land. The 
People of Detroit also understood that this was a land cession. This is evident in Egushwa’s 
words as stated previously. He clearly indicates the Aboriginal people’s response to the request 
for a cession of land from the Crown. This understanding is also evidenced in the proceedings of 
a Council held at the “Huron Village” in the vicinity of Detroit three months later, where the 
First Nations in attendance affirmed the boundaries of the lands that had been reserved for the 
Wyandot and excluded from the cession.
178
 Thus, the matter of land was clearly acknowledged 
by both the British and the Aboriginal peoples of the pays d’en haut as a central element of the 
agreement. 
Yet Aboriginal treaty-making in the pays d’en haut at the end of the eighteenth century 
differed substantially from contempory European treaty-making. Because the Aboriginal people 
maintained such considerable power in the region at this time, treaties that were concluded with 
them had to be undertaken on their terms. This much had been clearly illustrated the previous 
year at Fort Harmar. Even with the American failure to consider Aboriginal demands in any 
meaningful way, and their failure to successfully employ wampum diplomacy, the negotiations 
between the Americans and the Confederacy were conducted in the context of the middle 
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ground. In effect, the attempt to conclude a treaty at Fort Harmar had shown that the middle 
ground was still very much alive, and that attempts to dispense with it could be disastrous.  
 As the peoples of the Confederacy continued to hold the position of power in the pays 
d’en haut and shape the nature of diplomatic interactions in 1790, it is essential that Aboriginal 
understandings of treaties be recognized. An examination of the language employed by all 
parties provides some insight in this matter. The goods given to the Aboriginal people in 
attendance was referred to as “presents” in the text of the written treaty.179 It is possible that the 
land ceded to the British was suppose to be a “present.” Although Egushawa does not 
specifically state this, his invocation of the established relationship between the Crown and 
Aboriginal peoples frames it as a token in recognition of an ongoing relationship. Thus, it is 
plausible that both the British and Aboriginal participants saw the exchange as a gifting of land. 
This is significant because it framed the Treaty in the context of understandings of the middle 
ground. 
As discussed in the second chapter of this thesis, gifts were an essential part of 
interactions in the pays d’en haut. Gifts that were given in the middle ground effectively 
symbolized the agreement, and emphasised that the giver was sincere in their words. Because 
they symbolized the agreement on the occasion of which they were given, their treatment of gifts 
mirrored the status of the treaty.
180
  
Most importantly, gifts also established obligation between the giver and the receiver.
181
 
Therefore, when gifts were given to mark an agreement, they did not mark a one-time event, but 
one element of an ongoing, living relationship between the parties. The description of the goods 
given to the Peoples of Detroit in exchange for the land was similar with the other “Early Upper 
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Canadian Treaties” (which are commonly described as those land cession treaties covering parts 
of what would become Upper Canada in 1791 that were signed roughly between 1783 and 1815). 
They were seen as presents, and were a legacy from the earlier “Peace and Friendship” treaties 
that had been signed before the Royal Proclamation of 1763.
182
 The primary purpose of those 
treaties had been establishing and maintaining peaceful relations in the pays d’en haut.183 The 
elements of this earlier system focused heavily on diplomatic relations between the parties and it 
is likely that these practices did not stop in 1763. In her article focused on the Anishinabeg 
peoples specifically, Cary Miller argues that the importance of gift giving continued into the 
1820s and 1830s.
184
 Thus, when examining the practices of the Peoples of Detroit in 1790, 
including three Anishnabeg peoples (the Odawa, Ojibwa, and Potawatomi), it is likely that they 
too understood the gifts as a means to solidify diplomatic relations. Certainly, Egushwa, one of 
the most influential chiefs in attendance, would have been familiar with this custom.   
 Alexander McKee was also well aware of the legacy of diplomatic elements of treaty-
making. With no records detailing the nature of the negotiations, it is impossible to know what 
specifically McKee may or may not have promised the Confederacy.
185
 It is impossible to know 
whether he made any promises that guaranteed continued British support to them, including the 
supply of arms and ammunition and other supplies that they might need, over American protests. 
Although McKee was loyal to the Crown and worked for decades to secure its interests, he never 
abandoned his mother’s people and their interests. At this time he worked to ensure that their 
desires were met. In the end he continued to supply the Shawnee and other peoples of the 
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Confederacy with arms and other supplies.
186
 However, using his initiative, it is highly probable 
that McKee discussed the land surrender in terms that placed it within the context of the ongoing 
relationship between the Crown and the Confederacy. 
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Conclusion 
 
The McKee Treaty of 1790 continued to feature as an issue in the ongoing Aboriginal-
Newcomer relationship in the Southeastern corner of what would be sequentially the Province of 
Quebec, the Province of Upper Canada, the Province of Canada, and the Province of Ontario for 
decades. At later treaties concluded with peoples in the region into the first quarter of the 
nineteenth century, the provisions of the McKee Treaty would provide a base on which 
Aboriginal peoples would root their positions, and the terms that they sought.  
In 1829, some of the American descendants of the signatory nations petitioned for a share 
of the remaining Huron Reserve, on the basis that it had been given to the “Ottawa, Chippewa, 
Pottowatomy and Huron Indian Nations of Detroit” and not just to the Wyandot/Huron. This 
time however, the claim was rebuffed by Sir John Colborne on the basis that the First Nations 
themselves had decided to limit the rights of the Huron Reserve to the Wyandot following the 
signing of the original treaty in 1790.
187
 This marked a fundamental change from previous 
treaties, that had recognized all of the Aboriginal peoples signatories as owners whether they 
dwelt on the land or not. From this point on however, the British considered tenancy on the 
reserve to be all important. Interestingly this change in policy occurred at a point when the First 
Nations were no longer an important force required by the British for the defence of Upper 
Canada. Now that the Province was secure, other considerations would increase in importance. 
This decision was probably at least in part motivated by a desire to reduce the strength of the 
Aboriginal ties to the reserve, that the Government would soon attempt to purchase.
188
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keeping the numbers of those involved as low as possible the British were also minimizing the 
potential outlay they would have to make to buy the reserve. This was reflected in the purchase 
of most of what remained of the reserve in the 1836, which dealt only with the resident 
“Wyandot Tribe.”189 
The changes that have occurred since the original treaty was signed have effectively 
created the situation originally sought by the Land Board. The entire region covered by the 
Treaty passed into crown ownership and then to private individuals (some Aboriginal, some not). 
On November 1873 the remaining Aboriginal peoples living on what was left of the Huron 
Reserve petitioned for enfranchisement under the Indian Act.
190
 With their successful 
enfranchisement, the last vestige of the reserves created by the McKee Treaty were dissolved and 
severed into individual privately owned plots in Anderdon Township, for the decedents of the 
signatories that were no longer “Indians” in the eyes of the law. Today very few that live in the 
region covered by the treaty are aware of it or its significance. Among the few that are still aware 
of the Treaty are the Wyandot Nation of Anderdon, the descendants of the Wyandot at Detroit 
who signed the treaty in 1790. 
The Treaty has continued to be a source of litigation in the modern era. Walpole Island 
First Nation has submitted a claim, and after an initial rejection by the Government, an Inquiry 
held in 2000 recommended that they resubmit their claim under comprehensive claims policy, 
finding that any Aboriginal rights that existed in 1786 have not been subsequently 
extinguished.
191
 Caldwell First Nation, who resided at Point Peelee at the time of the signing of 
the Treaty, have also been able to settle a Land Claim with the Government of Canada in 
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2012.
192
 Thus, our interpretation and understanding of this treaty continues to hold relevance in 
the nature of the relationships between the parties to the Treaty 226 years after it was signed.  
Because of these subsequent events and the struggles of Aboriginal people in both 
Canada and the United states, it is all too easy to forget that First Nations remained a significant 
force in the pays d’en haut until the defeat of the Confederacy at the Battle of Fallen Timbers in 
1794, and the pullout by the British following signing of the Jay Treaty later that year. This 
research demonstrates that the history of treaty-making in Canada cannot stand in isolation as it 
does now, even after the American Revolution. To date, treaty history in what is now Ontario 
have focused exclusively on events on the Canadian side of the border. Similarly, the events 
occurring in what would only later become part of the United States cannot be understood in 
isolation from happenings in British North America. These national history paradigms must give 
way and instead adopt a regional approach to the topic. 
The signed treaty document that emerged from the council at Detroit on May 19
th
, 1790 
was an instrument of law meant to fulfill the needs of the Land Board for the District of Hesse— 
the body that was ultimately responsible for the creation of a treaty with the people of Detroit in 
the spring of 1790. Their needs exerted great influence over the form of the written treaty record, 
which today survives in the collection of Library and Archives Canada as originals and 
contemporary official duplicates. As a legal instrument in the British Common Law tradition, it 
served its purpose as an official record of an exchange of land. Still, while it was the Land Board 
that was responsible for the pursuit of a treaty in the spring of 1790, they had little influence on 
its negotiation, and the product that emerged was far more complex than a simple land cession. 
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 The McKee treaty was the product of months of negotiations that had taken place in the 
cultural and diplomatic middle ground of the pays d’en haut over the winter of 1789-90. 
Afforded a great deal of latitude by the lack of supervision at Detroit where he was the senior 
Indian Department officer, Alexander McKee crafted a treaty that met the disparate needs of all 
of the parties. Although his orders specified only that he should conduct a land purchase 
covering the unceded lands south of the River Thames, between the Detroit River and Long 
Point, McKee used his initiative and knowledge of the complexities of Aboriginal diplomacy to 
strengthen the bonds between the Aboriginal peoples of the Confederacy and the Crown at this 
crucial time, while obtaining the lands that were sought by the Land Board to facilitate the 
settlement of the area by non-Aboriginal peoples.  
The failure of the Treaty of Fort Harmar to end the conflict between the Aboriginal 
peoples of the Confederacy and the fledgling United States was a turning point in the struggle for 
the pays d’en haut, and marked the beginning of significant changes in the relationship between 
Aboriginal peoples and the Crown. The increased intensity of hostilities forced the peoples of the 
Confederacy to rely more heavily on Britain while simultaneously demonstrating their dedication 
to the concept of universal ownership of land within the Confederacy.  This placed them in a 
challenging position in 1790. The peoples of the Confederacy willingly acquiesced to the cession 
to strengthen their alliance with the British in the face of conflict with the United States. 
At the more local level, the Indigenous people of Detroit were also willing to work with 
the British to strengthen their relationship with the British at this time. The Treaties of Fort 
Harmar had proven detrimental to them. Prior to the signing of that treaty in 1789, many of these 
people had formed part of the neutral faction within the Confederacy that favoured negotiating 
with the Americans, and that had pushed for the treaty. This in turn saw them widely discredited 
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within the Confederacy, and in desperate need to improve their position, they also found 
themselves, and the Confederacy as a whole at war the Americans. For those among the peoples 
at Detroit who had favoured a neutral stance, concluding the treaty afforded them to improve 
their standing. Simultaneously, the treaty offered all peoples of Detroit the opportunity to 
enhance their relationship with the British. 
Thus, the McKee Treaty offered both Aboriginal peoples and the British the opportunity 
to strengthen their relationships with each other, at a time when they were heavily dependent 
upon one another. Extending far beyond a land sale agreement, the McKee Treaty of 1790 
functioned as a treaty of alliance that brought Aboriginal peoples and the British closer together. 
The extent of this reached far beyond the borders of what was legally recognized as the British 
Province of Quebec, and into the region south of the Lakes that is today the American Midwest. 
The treaty features as an important part of not only Canadian history, and the history of 
settlement, but also American history, and the shared history of the Great Lakes Region. More 
than that, this treaty signifies the complicated nature of Crown relations with the Indigenous 
people in the vicinity of Detroit at the end of the nineteenth century.   
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Appendix A: The McKee Treaty of 1790 
Source:  
Indian Treaties and Land Surrenders: from 1680 to 1890 in Two Volumes. Vol. 1. (Ottawa: 
Brown Chamberlin. 1891), 1-5.  
 
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS, that we the principal -Village and War 
Chiefs of the Ottawa, Chippawa, Pottowatomy and Huron Indians Nations of Detroit for and in 
consideration of the Sum of Twelve hundred Pounds Currency of the Province of Quebec at Five 
Shillings per Spanish Dollar for valuable Wares and Merchandise to us delivered by the bands of 
Alexander McKee, Esquire, Deputy Agent of Indian Affairs, the receipt whereof we do hereby 
acknowledge, have by and with the consent of ·the whole of our said Nations, given, granted, 
enfeoffed, alienated, and confirmed, and by these presents do give, grant, enfeoff, alien and 
confirm unto His Majesty George the Third, King of Great Britain, France and Ireland, Defender 
of the Faith, &c., &c., &e., a certain Tract of land beginning at the mouth of Catfish Creek, 
commonly called Rivière au Chaudière on the North Side of Lake Erie being the Western 
extremity of a Tract purchased by His said Majesty from the Messesagey Indians in the year One 
Thousand Seven Hundred and Eighty four and from thence running Westward along the border 
of Lake Erie and up the Straight to the mouth of a river known by the name of Channail Ecarté 
and up the main branch of the said Channail Ecarté to the first fork on the south side, then a due 
east line until it intersects the Rivière à la Tranche, and up the said Rivière à la Tranche to the 
North West corner of the said cession granted to His Majesty in the year One Thousand Seven 
Hundred and Eighty Four, then following the Western boundary of said tract being a due South, 
direction until it strikes the mouth of said Catfish Creek or otherwise Rivière au Chaudière being 
the first offset; 
 Reserving a Tract beginning at the Indian Officers Land at a small run near the head of 
the Island of Bois Blanc and running upwards along the border of the Streight to the beginning of 
the French Settlement above the head of the Petite Isle au D'Inde; then a due East line seven 
miles and then South so many miles as will intersect another East line run from the mouth of said 
Run or Gully near the head of said Island of Bois Blanc: 
 And another Tract beginning at the mouth of Rivière au Jarvais commonly called Knagg's 
Creek, running up along the border of the Streight to the Huron Church and one hundred and 
twenty arpents
193
 in depth with all and singular the appurtenances unto the said Tract of Land 
belonging or in anywise appertaining, and the reversion and reversions, remainder and 
remainders, rents and services of the said premises and all the estate, right, title, interest, 
property, claim or demand whatsoever of us the said Chiefs or any other person or persons 
whatever of our said Nations of, in, and to the said Tract of Land, or, of, in, and to every part and 
parcel thereof excepting the Reserve aforesaid. 
To have and to hold the said Lands and Premises hereby given and granted, 
mentioned or intended to be given and granted unto His said Majesty George the Third, His 
Heirs and Successors for the only proper use and behoof of His said Majesty George the Third, 
His Heirs and Successors for Ever. 
And we the said Chiefs for ourselves and the whole of our said Nations our and their 
Heirs, Executors and administrators do covenant, promise and grant to and with His said Majesty 
                                                 
193
 The arpent used in North America was equal to 180 French feet, or roughly 58.5 metres. 
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George the Third, His Heirs and Successors by these presents that His said Majesty His Heirs 
and Successors shall and lawfully may from henceforth and for ever after Peaceably and quietly 
have, hold, occupy, possess and enjoy the said tract of land hereby given and granted, mentioned 
or intended to be given and granted with all and every of the appurtenances free, elear, and 
discharged or well and sufficiently saved, kept harmless and indemnified of, from and against all 
former and other gifts, grants, bargains and sales and of, from and against all former and other 
Titles, troubles, charges or incumbrances whatever, had, done or suffered, or to be had, done or 
suffered by any of us the said Chiefs, or by anyone whatever of the said Nations our and their 
Heirs, Executors or administrators ; And by these presents do make this our act and Deed 
irrevocable under any pretence whatever, and have put His said Majesty in full possession and 
seizin by allowing houses to be built upon the Premises. 
 IN WITNESS WHEREOF, we the said Chiefs for ourselves and the said Nations have 
unto these Presents made the marks of our different Tribes, and affixed our Seals at Detroit, 
District of Hesse, in the Province of Quebec, this Nineteenth day of May, in the Thirtieth year of 
the Reign of Our Sovereign Lord George the Third, King Of Great 1itain, France and Ireland, 
Defender of the Faith, &C., and in the year of Our Lord one thousand seven hundred and ninety 
(1790). 
 
Signed, sealed and delivered in the presence of 
us in full Council: 
Pat. Murray, Major Commanding at Detroit, 
Richard Porter, Capt. 60th Regt., 
John J. Buller, Capt. 60th Regt., 
Charles Ingram, Capt. 60th Regt., 
I. Hesselberg, Lieut. 60th Regt., 
John Robertson, Lieut. R. R. Artillery 
E. Cartwright, Lieut. 60th Regt., 
Jb. Jordan, Lieut. 60th Regt., 
Saml. Gibbs, Ens. 60th Regt., 
G. Westphal, Adjt. 60th Regt., 
Jas. Henderson, Surgeon., 
A. Grant 
Alex Harrow, Lt. Commg. Nl. Dept., 
P. Frichette, Ptre Miss., 
Adhemar St. Martin, 
Gregor McGregor, Major of Detroit Militia, 
John Martin, Ensg. Militia 
Frans. Baby, Ensg. Militia 
William Robertson, 
T. Smith, Lieut. Militia, 
Thomas Reynolds, Asst. Comss. And        
          Storekeeper, 
Henry Hay, Ensign, 
Wm. Harffy. 
Pottowatomies. 
Sko-neque 
E-sha-ha 
Met-te-go-chin 
Pe-nash 
Shè-bense 
Key-way-te-nan 
 
Hurons. 
Sas-ta-rit-sie 
Ta-hou-ne-ha-wie-tie 
Ska-hou-mat 
Mon-do-ao 
Te-ha-tow-rence 
Son-din-ou 
Dow-yen-tet 
Ted-y-a-ta 
Tren-you-maing 
She-hou-wa-te-mon 
Meng-da-hai 
Tsough-ka-rats-y-wa 
Rou-nia-hy-ra 
 
Chippawas. 
Was-son 
Ti-e-cami-go-se 
Essebance 
Ouit-a-nis-sa 
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Nan-gie
194
 
Cha-bou-quai 
Wa-ban-di-gais 
Mesh-qui-ga-boui 
 
Ottawas. 
Egouch-e-ouay 
Wa-wish-kuy 
Ni-a-ne-go 
Ki-wich-e-ouan 
At-ta-wa-kie 
O-na-gan 
En-dah-in 
Maug-gic-a-way 
 
Recorded by me this 22nd day of June, 1790, at L’Assomption, in the District of Hesse. 
Register N. B, pages 374, 375, 376, 377. 
T. SMITH, C. C. P., 
D. H. 
 
We do hereby certify that the following goods were delivered in our presence to the 
several Nations; Subscribers to the within Deed agreeable to the consideration therein mentioned 
(viz.): 
  £ s. d. 
36 pairs 3 pt. blankets, at 12s…………………………………….. 21 12 0 
155    do   2½          do       10s. 6d………………………………… 81 7 6 
244    do   1½          do       5s. 9d………………………………….. 70 3 0 
250    do   1             do       5s. 9d………………………………….. 59 7 6 
155    do   2             do       7s……………………………………… 54 5 0 
35 pieces of Strouds, at 67s………………………………………. 117 5 0 
5      do      black cloth, 100 yards, 3s. 9d……………………….. 18 15 0 
12 yards of Moltons, 40s…………………………………………. 24 0 0 
140 yards of scarlet cloth, 8s………………………………………. 56 0 0 
12 pieces cadies, 420 yards, 2s. 6d……………………………….. 52 10 0 
26    do    Embolton linen, 96 yards, 15s 0½d……………………. 62 2 7 
20    do    linen, 500 yards, 16s…………………………………… 33 6 8 
5    do    callicoe, 40s……………………………………………. 10 0 0 
50 gross gartering, 12s…………………………………………… 30 0 0 
8 pieces of ribbon, 10s. 6d………………………………………. 4 4 0 
40 lbs. thread, 3s………………………………………………….. 6 0 0 
100 lbs. vermillion, 4s……………………………………………... 20 0 0 
1 dozen black silk handkerchiefs……………………………….. 1 10 0 
  722 8 3 
                                                 
194
 Note, Nangie is missing from transcripts of the treaty that have been published. This error stems from T. Smith’s 
copy of the treaty made on the 22
nd
 of June, 1790 from which the transcripts were made which failed to include 
Nangie name. 
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  £ s. d. 
20 dozen plain hats at 15s………………………………………... 15 0 0 
40 nests of tin kettles, 21s………………………………………... 42 0 0 
10 gross knives, 30s……………………………………………… 15 0 0 
60 guns, 20s. 6d…………………………………………………... 61 10 0 
20 rifles, 50s……………………………………………………… 50 0 0 
400 lbs. powder, 74s………………………………………….......... 14 16 0 
1,600 lbs. ball and shot, 21s…………………………………………. 16 16 0 
2,000 flints, 10s……………………………………………………… 1 0 0 
30 dozen looking glasses, 3s……………………………………... 4 10 0 
50 plyers, 2s………………………………………………………. 5 0 0 
10 pair callimaneon, 21s………………………………………….. 10 10 0 
4 nests trunks, 42s………………………………………………. 8 8 0 
12 dozen scissors, 2s. 9d…………………………………………. 1 13 0 
12 dozen penknives, 3s…………………………………………… 1 16 0 
1,000 fish hooks……………………………………………………... 1 2 6 
12 dozen ivory combs, 4s. 6d…………………………………….. 2 14 4 
12 dozen horn combs, 2s…………………………………………. 1 4 0 
600 lbs. brass kettles, 15s………………………………………….. 37 10 0 
  290 9 0 
2 gross fire steels, at 4s………………………………………….. 0 8 0 
10   do    pipes, 1s 3d……………………………………………... 0 12 6 
  1 0 6 
  722 8 3 
  290 9 0 
             Sterling………………………………………………... 1,013 17 9 
             Equal to Halifax currency…………………………….. 1,126 11 4 
39 gallons of rum, at 3s. 9d………………………………………. 7 6 3 
A bullock………………………………………………………… 13 0 0 
400 lbs. tobacco, at 1s. 3d…………………………………………. 25 0 0 
24 laced hats, at 20s………………………………………………. 24 0 0 
11 gross pipes, at 1s. 6d…………………………………………...  16 6 
2 ¼ gross cuttcaw knives…………………………………………... 3 5 11 
             Halifax currency or the currency of the Province of 
                   Quebec…………………………………………….   £1,200 
 
0 
 
0 
     
 Pat. Murray, Major Commanding. 
Richd. Porter, Capt. 2nd Batt. 60th Regt. 
Charles Ingram, Capt. 60th Regt. 
John I. Buller, Capt. 60th Regt. 
T. Hesselberg, Lt. 60th Regt. 
J. Jordan, Lt. 60th Regt. 
David Meredith, Lieut. R.R. Artillery. 
E. Cartwright, Lieut, 60th Regt. 
John Robertson, Lt. 60th Regt. 
Saml. Gibbs, Ens. 60
th
 Regt. 
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G. Westphal, Adjutant 2
nd
 Batt, 60th Regt. 
Jas. Henderson, Surgeon. 
 
The above recorded at L’Assomption, in the District of Hesse, this 22nd day of June, 
1790. 
Register No. B, page 378. 
T. SMITH, C.C.P., 
D. H. 
End  
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Appendix B:  
 
Source:  
Superintendent of Indian Affairs in the Northern District of North America fonds,  
MG 19, F 35- Superintendent of Indian Affairs Series 2 – lot 682 
(reel H-2944) 
 
 
(p.1) 
C1) 
Council Held at Detroit the 19
th
 Day of May 1790. with the following Nations of Indians. 
   (viz) “ Ottawa 
 “ Chippawa 
 “ Pottowatomy & 
 “ Huron 
 
Pres
t
 Patrick Murray, Esquire, Major 60
th
 Reg
t
. 
Commandant &c. 
Alexander M
c
Kee Esq
r
. D : Agent &c 
Captain Porter 
Captain Ingram         60
th
 Regt. 
Capt. Buller 
Capt. Grant, Naval Dep
t
. 
Lieut: Hepelbergh 
Lieut: Robertson         60
th
 Reg
t
. 
Lieut: Cortwright 
Lieut: Meredith. R.R. Artillery 
Lieut: Gordan – 60th. Regt. 
Lieut: Hanaw Naval Dep
t
 
Lieut: Ford — ditto 
Ensign Gibbs 60
th
. Reg
t
 
Adjutant Westphal ditto 
Surgeon Henderson d
o
_ 
             and 
officers of the Militia, Principal Magistrates 
and a Number of other Gentlemen, Citizens.  
 
 
Sworn Interpreters 
 
Isadore Chene 
Simon Girty 
 
Principal 
 
(p.2) 
Principal Chiefs  
of the  
Ottawa  
E.gouch.e.ouai 
Wa.wish.kuy 
Ni.a.ne.go 
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Nation Ki.wish.e.ouan 
Atta.wa.kie 
O.na.gan 
En.dash.in 
Maug.gich.a.way 
 
Principal Chiefs  
of the  
Chippawa  
Nation 
 
Was.son 
Ti.e.cami.go.se 
Esse.bance 
Ouit.a.nis.sa 
Nangie 
Cha.bou.quai 
Wa.ban.di.gais 
Mesh.qui.ga.boui 
 
Principal Chiefs  
of the  
Pottowatomy  
Nation 
 
Skno.nesque 
E.sha.ha 
Met.te.go.chin 
Penash 
She.bence 
Key.way.te.nan 
 
Principal Chiefs  
of the  
Huron  
Nation 
 
Sasta.rits.ie 
Ta.hou.ne.ha.wie.tie 
Ska.hou.mat 
Mou.do.ro 
Te.ha.tow.rence . 
Son.din.ou 
(Signed)  
Isadore Chene,  
Interpretor 
 
(p.3) 
Dou.ywn.tet 
Ted.y.a.ta 
Tren.you.maing 
She.hou.wa.te.mon 
Meng.da.hai 
Tsough.ka.rats.y.wa 
Rou.mia.hy.ra 
 
_____________________________ 
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E.gouch.e.ouai. Chief 
of the Ottawas in the 
name of the Lake 
Confederacy arose and 
Spoke 
 
 
(Signed)  
Isadore Chene 
      Interpreter 
 
(p.4) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
E.gouch.e.ouai 
speaking to the Hurons. 
 
 
 
 
 
(Signed)  
Isadore Chene 
      Interpreter 
 
 
(p.5) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Father. We are now within the Paternal House where every one is free 
to Speak his mind; therefore Father, I request the same of our 
Fathers the officers, our Brethren the Merchants and of all you 
my Brothers of my own Colour, Indians of Different Nations. 
 
Father. You have told us that you have received Letters from our 
Father the General, and our Father Sir John Johnson acquainting you 
that our Father the Great King had written to them, to know if We 
would cede him a Piece of Land extending from the from the other 
side of the River to the line of that ceded by the Messesagez. 
Father. 
 
Father, Is there a man amongst us who will refuse this request? What 
man can refuse what is asked by a Father so good and so generous, 
that he has never yet refused us any thing? What Nation? None Father! 
We have agreed to grant all you ask according to the limits settled 
between us and you, and which we are all acquainted with. We Grant 
it you all Father, in Presence of our Fathers the officers and our 
Brothers the Merchants. _ 
 
Brothers. Altho’ we have granted the Land on the other side of the 
River to our Father, we have not forgotten you. We always 
remembered Brothers what our ancestors had granted you, that is to 
say Brothers, from the Church to the River Jarvais, as well as a piece 
of Land commencing at the Entry of the River Canard extending 
upwards to the line of the inhabitants, and which reaches downwards 
beyond the River Canard to the Line of the Inhabitants.  
 
Father. You have hears what I have said, I request you Father not to 
suffer our Brothers the Hurons to be molested. And you Brothers the 
Hurons, that you will not 
molest 
 
molest our Brothers the Inhabitants. 
 
Father. This is all I have to say, I salute you, and all my Brothers here 
present, as well as all the Indians of the Different Nations Present — 
and as a proof that all we have agreed to is done from our Hearts — 
We are ready to Sign our marks. — 
 
Father. I Request you produce the Deed, the contents of which have 
been already explained to us, that we may sign it in the presence of our 
Fathers and Brothers. 
 
T Smith. Acting                                                 (Signed) Isadore Chene. 
Clk in Council                                                                        Interpretter 
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Major Murray’s … 
answer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(p.6) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(p.7) 
Captain M
c
.Kee 
     Spoke . .  
 
 
 
 
I salute you in the name of our Father the Great King George, and in 
those of your Fathers the Commander in Chief, and Sir John Johnson 
who are appointed by his Majesty to watch over the Interests of his 
Children in this Country. 
 
     I return thanks to the Great Spirit through whose favour we have 
the happiness of meeting as one Family and shall inform his 
Excellency Lord Dorchester of the Unanimous and Dutiful manner in 
which you have complied with his Lordship’s desire, by ceding to the 
King for the purpose of settling such of his Majesty’s Subjects as may 
come to live upon 
it. 
 
it. The Country extending from Lake Erie to the Chennail Ecarte as far 
as its first Southern fork, thence by an East Line to River La Trance 
and along that River until it meets the Line of the Missesagui 
Purchase. 
 
     Your Fathers the Governor and Superintendant General ever 
attentive to fulfill the King’s wishes for the general good of his 
Children have commanded us who are placed here under their 
authority to be equally regardful of the Ease and Comfort of the 
Indians, and of the welfare of the white Inhabitants: They have 
directed an ample consideration to be given you for the Land, and you 
have agreed with Captain Mackee upon the Sum, as fully sufficient. 
 
     The great King and those in office under him, in providing for the 
advantage of the white Inhabitants seek not to disturb the repose of 
any of his Indian Children; Such parts therefore of the territory which 
your Ancestors granted the Hurons your Bretheren as you have found 
requisite for the General Good that they should retain, is reserved for 
their occupation that they may in Common with the other Nations 
present remain under the care of a Father who is equally desirous of 
promoting their happiness, and able to protect them from oppression. –  
Cap
t
. 
 
     The Commanding officer having returned you thanks on behalf of 
your Father the King. It remains now only with me to pay you the 
consideration agreed upon, which shall be done tomorrow morning so 
soon as your several Nations are assembled for the purpose. 
 
T Smith. a:c                                      A M
c
:Kee D.A.I.A. 
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(p.8) 
Extract of the Minutes of a Council held with the Indians at Detroit 19
th
 of May 1790. 
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Appendix C:  
 
Source:  
Extract from the Journal of Indian transactions at Detroit Kept by Alexr. M
c
.kee Esq. Deputy 
Agent from the 18
th
 to the 22
nd
 of May 1790, 16 November 1829, Office of the Deputy 
Superintendent General of Indian Affairs: Correspondence, 1789-1830, Library and Archives 
Canada. Microfilm Reel C-11014. 
 
 
(23881) 
 
Extract from the Journal of Indian transactions at Detroit Kept by Alexr. M
c
.kee Esq. Deputy 
Agent from the 18
th
 to the 22
nd
 of May 1790. 
 
May 18
th
.  Some Huron Chiefs arrived and a Meeting was held with them in presence of the 
Lake Indians, where the Kings Medal was Confered at their own particular desire 
On One of their Chiefs who was appointed to fill the place of their Great Chief 
Susterage, whose name he assumed. This business being finished, we left them to 
Consult with each Other respecting the purchase of Land. _________________ 
“ 19th. Finding that the Nations had not universally agreed in their Opinions respecting 
the Cession, I had a meeting with them, and settled matters so that they gave 
their unanimous consent and desired to have a public meeting in the Council 
Chamber that they may declare their sentiments and Expecte the Deed, which 
was accordingly done, I then informed them that the Compensation should be 
made them tomorrow, this day being too far advanced to accomplish it. _______ 
“ 20th. The Indians being again assembled, they received the Compensation to the 
Amount of Twelve hundred pounds Halifax Currency in the presence of the 
Commanding Officer & the Officers of the Garrison. _______ 
The 
 
(23882) 
 
 
May 21
st
. The Indians were employed in distributing amoust them the Clothing they 
received yesterday. ____ 
“ 22d. I delivered them a Bullock and some Rum to make a Feast as Customary on such 
Occasions. ______ 
  
 I Certify the forgoing Statement to be a true Extract from the Rcord of Indian 
transactions at Detroit, deposited in the office of the Indian Department at 
Montreal. 
Office for Indian Affairs Montreal 
10
th
 November 1829.  
[signature] D. C. Napier  
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